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Abstract: 
 
       This thesis will center upon the level of involvement Americans had in the Greek 
War of Independence from 1821-1829 despite remaining neutral during the conflict. 
Primarily focusing on the contributions of individuals and organizations, the thesis will 
discuss the political actions that occurred to support the Greeks, and how different 
American citizens contributed to the conflict. In addition, the text will explore why the 
United States did not formally give support to the war despite the philhellenism of 
prominent political figures, such as Thomas Jefferson and Daniel Webster. Groups and 
individuals in the Boston area had competing interests that both helped and hindered aid 
to the Greek cause. Trade interests with China and Turkey motivated Bostonian elites to 
press Congress to stay out of the conflict. These same forces, however, along with 
political likening to the cause, fueled individual efforts that provided private American 
aid to the Greek Independence Movement. 
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Preface 
 
 As a student of history with a deep interest in the Classics, I always wanted to 
explore a topic that related to the Ancient World. In my prospectus class with Dr. Mather, 
I was given the task of exploring a topic related to the history of Massachusetts and 
Rhode Island, as well as “diving deep” into maritime trade. Approaching the subject as 
someone who specializes in a completely different era of history, I reflected on the topics 
where the Classics intersected with American Maritime history. One of the subjects that 
came to mind was Neo-Classical America, and the founding ideals of America’s 
government.  
I recalled the excitement of one of my undergraduate professors, Dr. John 
Lawless, as he explained the way early 19
th
 century Americans held onto the Classics, 
and how our Founding Fathers, most prominently Thomas Jefferson, entrenched 
themselves in the literature from two millennia ago. As he explained, “Ante Bellum 
America was the golden age of Neo-Classical thought… not only did our ancestors read 
and understand dead tongues, but also they adopted what they learned and put it into 
political action.” He then went on to briefly mention the American Revolution and the 
Greek War for Independence, stating, “It was the first time the American public rallied 
together for a foreign cause, and it was because of their shared love of Classical writings 
that the people of the Early Republic came together on this issue.”  
 When my class with Dr. Lawless came to an end, I felt that my understanding of 
America’s involvement in the Greek War for Independence was incomplete, and wanted 
to know why the United States refused to enter the war, despite such public support. 
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Thus, when given the opportunity in my graduate-level prospectus class, I decided to 
finally answer this conundrum for myself. At first I was satisfied with what I found in the 
available academic literature, as there were a multitude of accounts of individuals 
participating in the conflict, and entire articles dedicated to what Americans did to help 
the Greek cause. Yet I soon discovered that while the topic had been widely explored, the 
explanations for why America stayed out of the conflict seemed to just accept the Monroe 
Doctrine as the central reason for staying out of the conflict—no historian seemed 
interested in discussing how or why the government just accepted this policy. This all 
changed when I came across an article by Michael Chapman, for, unlike the other 
historians I read, he suggested that something did not seem right about America’s 
neutrality during this war, and instead proposed an economic explanation for America’s 
refusal to participate. Pointing to questionable political connections and America’s 
involvement in the Chinese opium trade, Chapman made me question everything that I 
had read up to that point. The topic had shifted from a societal study to a political and 
economic subject, I focused upon the wealth and connections of the Boston merchant, 
Col. Thomas H. Perkins. 
 This pushed me to travel to archives across the region and to ask a new series of 
questions, such as, who was Thomas H. Perkins? Why did he know John Quincy Adams? 
Who else did he know? Why did he not like the Greek cause? At this point, the nature of 
my research had shifted from a simple historical exploration of a topic to something 
exciting and almost mysterious. Never before had I encountered something so 
challenging to the traditional historical narrative of a subject. It was Carl Seaburg and 
Stanley Patersons’ biography of Col. Thomas Perkins that brought all of my evidence, 
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both primary and secondary, together. After months of investigation and reading, I could 
now present a case on what I had studied and, perhaps, stimulate questions about our 
traditional understanding of American history at the time of Greek Independence.  
 With the guidance of my advisor, Dr. Rod Mather, and months of research and 
writing, I present to the reader my final insights. As my freshman historiography 
professor, Dr. Constance Rousseau, taught me, nothing can ever be certain in 
understanding what happened in the past, but, as historians, it is our job to find some 
truth and remind the world to question our traditional understanding of the past. I hope 
my investigation into this topic can spark true academic debate on the subject, and 
encourage us all to investigate history with speculative eyes. As my undergraduate 
mentor, Dr. Fred Drogula, taught me, it is only through the primary sources and our 
prudent investigation of them that we can find some truth about the past. This work 
attempts to hold onto this value, and use the evidence that is actually out there to 
construct an understanding of the past.  
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Introduction and Historiography: 
 
The Early American Republic faced several challenges as its government 
attempted to uphold revolutionary and republican values while navigating diplomacy 
with former allies and enemies. Tested by the War of 1812, the economic panics of 1807 
and 1817, and upholding Washington’s recommendation for neutrality, the young 
Republic discovered that foreign affairs challenged the very foundation of America’s 
identity. Since the country’s early economy was strained, its leaders felt pressure to 
compromise Revolutionary values for financial prosperity. The Greek War for 
Independence proved to be one of these great obstacles, and required leaders, as well as 
businessmen, to choose between a cause they believed in and economic prosperity.  
Popular support for joining the international community to defend the Greek 
people spoke to the nation’s ideologies of Classical Liberalism, Classical Republicanism, 
and Christian Brotherhood yet the government of the United States ultimately refrained 
from joining the conflict. This restraint might be explained by the spreading notion that 
the nation’s economic stability might become uncertain if the young nation became 
involved with the Greek conflict. Individuals, as well as communities, felt increasingly 
vulnerable to possible commercial ambiguity. Thus, in the early days of the American 
Republic, it was only logical for the United States government to secure its economic 
bearings before engaging into serious military and diplomatic upheavals.   
Despite the clear economic concerns, the more popular explanations for why 
the United States stayed out of the conflict have centered upon diplomatic and 
political considerations. One of the most prevalent arguments is that John Quincy 
 2 
 
Adams did not want to be allied with the British immediately after the War of 1812, 
and United States did not want the powers of Europe interfering in Latin American 
and United States affairs. While these explanations are true and were the official 
policies of the United States government at the time, it seems more likely that 
economic factors heavily influenced the ultimate decision to not intervene. The 
young Republic was recovering from war and much of its economy depended upon 
trade. At this time, Colonel Thomas H. Perkins, a wealthy Boston merchant involved 
in the Canton trade and opium market, and other prominent figures involved in 
commerce were attempting to expand their wealth and wanted a stable economy to 
do so. The political maneuverings of Col. Thomas H. Perkins and his economic 
influence on the Boston community suggest that the real reason for United States’ 
neutrality was not diplomatic concerns, but rather economic interests and 
backroom deals. By examining letters, public papers, and speeches from the time, it 
is evident that American neutrality during the Greek War for Independence was 
brought on by individual interests, political connections, and concern over the 
country’s maritime economy. 
The sources and scholars that have dealt with this topic have explored 
several different aspects of why America remained neutral from the conflict. While 
much of the work has focused primarily upon diplomatic and political reasoning for 
neutrality, the most significant and recent revelation in scholarship on the subject 
has looked to economic factors as the main cause of the neutrality. Therefore, the 
extent of private involvement and influence in the government’s decision to not join 
the Greek War for Independence can be illuminated by secondary sources. More 
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specifically, it is through an examination of scholarly work that deals directly with 
this subject, the historical literature that focuses upon the philosophical thinking of 
Ante Bellum America, and the lives of prominent figures of this time that this 
influence can be understood. 
Studies of American involvement in the Greek War for Independence can be 
divided into three or four different schools of thought. One perspective focuses on a 
political and diplomatic reasoning for American neutrality, and tends to focus on 
President John Quincy Adams’ own political philosophy for the refrainment.1 Another 
posits that Adams reacted to this situation not just out of his own political and diplomatic 
philosophy, but also because he wanted to distance himself from the controversial 
Federalist Party.
2
 A third perspective insists that economics and commerce were the 
primary motivation for non-involvement. The economic reasoning did not necessarily 
focus on the general welfare of the country, but rather upon certain individuals that held 
substantial financial investment in both the United States and Turkey.
3
 The last school of 
thought takes on a more post-modern approach that centers upon the ways individual 
Americans were involved in the conflict. This view does not directly address the 
discussion of economics versus politics, but rather focuses on how Americans contributed 
to the conflict.  The reasons why the government did not formally get involved are 
ignored. If authors that subscribe to this perspective do take a side, they generally 
                                                        
          
1
 Angelo Repousis, “’The Cause of the Greeks:’ Philadelphia and the Greek War for 
Independence, 1821-1828,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 123, no. 4 
(October 1999): 333-363. 
          
2
 Lawrence S. Kaplan, “The Monroe Doctrine and the Truman Doctrine: The Case of 
Greece,” Journal of the Early Republic 13, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 1-21. 
          
3
 Michael E. Chapman, “Pragmatic, ad hoc Foreign-Policy Making of the Early Republic: 
Thomas H. Perkins’s Boston–Smyrna–Canton Opium Model and Congressional Rejection of Aid 
for Greek Independence,” International History Review 35, no. 3 (2013): 449-464.  
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indicate that the Monroe Doctrine and politics prevented the government from being 
formally involved.
4
  
What is most interesting about the different perspectives on this topic is the 
universal agreement on a handful of different ideas and concepts. First, all authors seem 
to agree that there was massive popular support for the Greek Revolution and that 
Americans held certain assumptions about the innocence of the Greek people. Second, all 
historians agree that the justification and interest for support of the Greek War for 
Independence came from America’s admiration of the “Ancient Past,” a common 
Christian heritage with the Greeks, and America’s view that the Greeks were also 
fighting for the same revolutionary tenants as the Americans had. In addition, Americans 
saw this as an important opportunity to be the model Republic in the world. If Americans 
supported the Greek cause, then the nation would be passing on the revolutionary spirit 
and acting as a leader for other emerging republics. Finally, all sources agree that John 
Quincy Adams did not want to get directly involved in Greece, irrespective of whether 
there were good diplomatic and/or economic reasons. The points that Adams used in his 
defense of non-involvement were a continuation of Washington’s appeal for isolationism 
and James Monroe’s diplomatic precedence with the Monroe Doctrine.  
The school of thought that focuses the most on these common themes is the post-
modernist group that explores American interest in the conflict, and the contributions of 
individuals. One author from this school is Edward M. Earle; his work, which dates back 
to 1927, is one of the earliest academic accounts on this topic. Earle argues that support 
of the Greek War for Independence was very popular with the American people; Greek 
                                                        
        
4
 Edward Meade Earle, “American Interest in the Greek Cause, 1821-1827,” The American 
Historical Review 33, no. 1 (1927): 44-63. 
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Committees organizing resources for the war popped up all around the country in cities, 
such as Boston, New York, and Philadelphia.
5
 The author points to the different 
individual contributions that helped support the cause.  Such contributions included 
donations, fundraising events, and the donation of space on ships to the Greek 
Committees for sending supplies to the Greeks.
6
 Aside from the material contributions of 
individuals, Earle also discusses the personal involvement of individuals in the conflict 
and demonstrates how important this conflict was in the minds of many Americans.
7
 
Earle also discusses in detail the reasons people favored the Greeks and wanted to help 
them so desperately. Using the Bostonians Edward Everett, the leader of the Greek 
Committee of Boston and also a United States congressman at the time, and Daniel 
Webster, a prominent United States senator that was known for his strong support for the 
Greek cause, as examples Earle explains that Americans supported the war because 
people admired the Ancient Greeks. Furthermore, he discusses how the Greek Revolution 
had adopted the revolutionary ideas of America, and how the Greeks were fellow 
Christians being oppressed by Muslims. This gave Americans a sense of brotherhood 
with the Greek people.
8
 Earle discusses the Monroe Doctrine, but only mentions the 
foreign policy to justify United States neutrality during the conflict.
9
 The focus of his 
paper was the support from individual Americans, not the reasons why America decided 
to remain neutral. 
                                                        
         
5
 Edward Meade Earle, “American Interest in the Greek Cause, 1821-1827,” The American 
Historical Review 33, no. 1 (1927): 50.  
         
6
 Ibid., 51. 
         
7
 Ibid., 54-55. 
         
8
 Ibid., 44-49. 
         
9
 Ibid., 49. 
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Andrew Horton’s text on Jefferson and Korais further examines the reason why 
Americans were interested in the conflict but also how the influence of these two men 
effected public perception of the war. Horton argues that the long-term relationship 
between Thomas Jefferson and Adamantios Korais, exemplified by extensive 
correspondence between the two men, helped plant the seed of liberty and revolution in 
each other’s country. Through the comparison and exchange of ideas between the 
American culture and Greek history, each civilization mutually supported and inspired 
the other. Specifically, Korais was inspired by the American struggle and liberalism 
while Jefferson and his peers were influenced by the Classics. The discussion of Ancient 
History and the views of early-modern political philosophers, such as Rousseau and 
Locke, brought these prominent figures together intellectually and each inspired the 
other’s cause.10 Horton’s text, while brief in its discussion, demonstrates the 
philosophical and cultural commonalities between Greece and America. It identifies the 
reasons for America’s popular support of the conflict and serves as an important 
academic source that many scholars of this field draw upon.  
 Earl and Horton serve as the basic foundation of the subject; their articles are the 
first to identify the historical sources and explain why Americans were interested in the 
Greek War for Independence. In addition, both serve as the launching point for the 
economic and political perspectives of this field that one sees in academia today.  
 The first perspective that emerged after these foundational studies of the subject 
centered upon the political and diplomatic reasons as to why America did not formally 
become involved in Greek Independence. For a lack of better terms, these historians can 
                                                        
        
10
 Andrew S. Horton, “Jefferson and Korais: The American Revolution and the Greek 
Constitution,” Comparative Literature Studies 13, no. 4 (December 1976): 323-324. 
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be viewed as the Monrovian
11
 and Anti-Federalist schools of thought. Lawrence Kaplan 
best represents the political argument (Anti-Federalist view) for why America decided to 
not become involved. Pointing to John Quincy Adams, Kaplan explains that becoming 
involved in the conflict would have been a bad move for America and Adams politically. 
If the British were to become involved in Greece, and Americans were fighting right 
along side them, it would imply that Adams was a Federalist and that Adams was willing 
to forget the War of 1812. If Adams was to involve the United States on the side of the 
British, then it would be seen as an act of treason because the Federalists wished to 
secede from the United States during the War of 1812 and give aid to the British.
12
 
Kaplan also explains that Adams thought it was America’s duty to remain independent 
from European conflicts even if an event seemed to echo the American Revolution. To 
reinforce this point, Kaplan points to the Monroe Doctrine as Adams’ reasoning for 
staying out of the conflict entirely. Adams did not want to risk being entangled in 
European conflicts and he wanted to keep Europe out of Latin America. Going to war in 
Greece would give European powers license to interfere in the Americas. While Kaplan 
helps exemplify the tenants of this perspective, he draws much of his arguments from 
Ernest May, and the focus of Kaplan’s article is a comparative analysis of U.S. relations 
with Greece between the 1820s and 1947. 
Angelo Repousis builds off of Kaplan’s work by re-evaluating the reasons why 
America did not get involved in the Greek War for Independence. Repousis echoes the 
                                                        
       
11
 Monrovian is the historical perspective that reasons the United States stayed out of the 
Greek War for Independence because of the Monroe Doctrine’s commitment to staying out of 
European affairs. This view draws upon diplomatic commitments and political ties for its 
justification. 
       
12
 Lawrence S. Kaplan, “The Monroe Doctrine and the Truman Doctrine: The Case of 
Greece,” Journal of the Early Republic 13, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 2-3. 
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same understanding of the Monroe Doctrine as Kaplan but also demonstrates that despite 
the reluctance to commit the United States to a European conflict there was a real urge to 
be involved in some way. In fact, James Monroe approached Congress, and the public at 
large, pleading for non-intervention with the military but also encouraging relief efforts 
to be made and supplies to be sent to the Greeks.
13
 Furthermore, Repousis argues that 
Adams feared getting involved in a foreign conflict unrelated to Europe, specifically one 
that involved Egypt and other African states.
14
 While Repousis certainly takes the 
diplomatic and political perspective on American neutrality, he does touch upon an 
important point in regard to trade. While he does not use economics as a main argument, 
he does open up the door to another reason why America did not get involved. 
Specifically, some businessmen, particularly Boston merchants, were nervous about the 
repercussions of a war with Turkey on their companies; they were even nervous about 
non-combative assistance to the Greeks.
15
 The risk of upsetting the Ottoman Empire 
raised the concern that trade in the Mediterranean Sea could be diminished, and Muslim 
pirates and the Barbary States would become emboldened and be far more active in 
attacking American vessels since they were allied with the Ottoman Empire. Adding this 
to the diplomatic reasons, Repousis takes a position that rests upon mostly political 
reasoning and a certain degree of economic protection. 
From this argument, one can see the foundation of an economic perspective in this 
area of study. The first to take a mostly economic perspective is Michael Chapman. 
Chapman proposes that merchants were nervous about the economic repercussions of the 
                                                        
        
13
 Angelo Repousis, “’The Cause of the Greeks:’ Philadelphia and the Greek War for 
Independence, 1821-1828,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 123, no. 4 
(October 1999): 338-339.  
        
14
 Ibid. 
        
15
 Ibid., 340.  
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United States opposing Ottoman policy as it would certainly result in restricted access to 
the Mediterranean and the potential loss of profit. Chapman suggests that these merchants 
utilized their financial resources to influence politicians and protect their ability to travel 
the seas. By way of example, Chapman discusses how profitable Col. Thomas H. 
Perkins’ China trade through Turkey was, estimating that it generated over $1 million 
($84 million in today’s economy) annually in profit from Perkins’ company alone.16 He 
further argues that the political reasons for neutrality were cosmetic, and that even the 
supporters of Greek Independence ended up being convinced by the merchants’ 
argument. Chapman demonstrates this sudden shift by discussing how Everett, an ardent 
supporter of the Greek cause, did not protest or try to push harder for the conflict after the 
vote in the United States Congress was tabled.
17
 Chapman further supports his argument 
by discussing the relationships between the different Bostonians (Perkins, Adams, 
Everett) involved in the ultimate decision with Col. Thomas H. Perkins. Thereby proving 
that aversion to the war was caused by economic worries rather than diplomatic and 
political resolve.  
 Other scholars that specialize in the Early American Republic provide additional 
evidence that provides a context for the events surrounding the Greek War for 
Independence. While these authors cannot be attributed to a particular and, at best, most 
closely resemble the positions of Earl and Horton. Literature on the lives of important 
individuals and the culture of the Early Republic contribute the most to this area of study. 
In particular, the Merchant Prince of Boston, by Carl Seaburg and Stanley Patterson, 
                                                        
        
16
 Michael E. Chapman, “Pragmatic, ad hoc Foreign-Policy Making of the Early Republic: 
Thomas H. Perkins’s Boston–Smyrna–Canton Opium Model and Congressional Rejection of Aid 
for Greek Independence,” International History Review 35, no. 3 (2013): 453-454.  
        
17
 Ibid., 452. 
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examines the life of Col. Thomas H. Perkins. The authors use letters, speeches, journals, 
and correspondences to characterize not only the role and influence of Perkins on the 
Bostonian and New England economy, but also his stake and participation in the 
Massachusetts political arena. By the same token, the book Israel Thorndike: Federalist 
Financier, by J.D. Forbes, provides a similar biographical sketch, and hints at the 
interconnectedness of the elites of Boston’s merchant class. These biographical works act 
as valuable resources in their own right, and Chapman and others of his school of thought 
focused on the resources available in these works.  
 Carl J. Richard specializes in Neo-Classical American study and has authored 
several works that are foundational to the study of this period in American history. 
Richard’s Founders and the Classics: Greece, Rome, and the American Enlightenment 
and The Golden Age of the Classics in America provide important insight into the Ante 
Bellum period’s cultural lifestyle. The Founders and the Classics specifically examines 
the Classical scholarship of America’s Founding Fathers, and chronicles their use and 
consumption of these works in their everyday life. Furthermore, Richard also discusses 
the influence of these ancient texts upon the Founding Fathers when it came to 
developing the Constitution of the United States. The Golden Age, by contrast, focuses 
less upon the Classical scholarship of the founders and more upon the emulation of 
antiquity in the everyday life of Ante Bellum America. Through the examination of 
pastoralism, democracy, slavery, and nationalism, Richard’s work explains the way in 
which Americans placed ancient ideas into the national fabric. Furthermore, Richard 
characterizes the study of Classics as a focus for American elites and the middle class, as 
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well as a main tenant of American farmers (especially in the South).
18
 Both of Richard’s 
texts provide important commentary on the culture and identity of the Early American 
Republic, and each makes the case for an America that tied itself very closely to the 
history of Ancient Greece and Rome. Each school of thought, especially the post-
modernist school championed by Earle and Horton, draws upon the ideas and historical 
trends that are expressed in Richard’s works. Hence does Richard’s work best explain the 
context of this period, and demonstrates why the United States government would show 
preference to the Greek Independence struggle over other revolutionary movements in 
other nations such as Serbia.  
 This thesis sides with the economic perspective on the events surrounding 
American neutrality and extends the arguments first developed by Chapman. 
Contributing to the idea that individual private parties influenced political decision-
making on the federal level for financial interest, this work adds to Chapman’s view and 
further sophisticates the economic school of thought. Unlike Chapman, however, this 
thesis emphasizes the idea that local politics, business relationships, personal 
associations, and political affiliations gave prominent individuals the ability to bend 
national politicians to their own personal agenda. Through the examination of letters, 
biographies, and various first-hand accounts, the influence of private individuals over 
national figures is made clear.  
 Despite the overwhelming popular support for the Greek people, because of the 
perceived philosophical and cultural similarity to American society, the influence of 
wealthy individuals not only smothered the democratic voice of the country, but also 
                                                        
          
18
 Carl J. Richard, The Golden Age of the Classics in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2009), 85-88.  
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spoke on the nation’s behalf in determining American foreign policy for the rest of the 
19th century. Shining a light upon the business practices and dealings of the prominent 
merchants Thomas H. Perkins and Israel Thorndike, one can see just how influential and 
invested these men were in American politics. These individuals built political networks, 
controlled the financial and political fates of entire states, and expanded their business 
empires to halfway across the world. Through money and political puppet mastery, the 
Boston mercantile elites tamed several national figures and utilized the positions of these 
politicians to protect their own investments. Thus, it was not truly in the interest of the 
nation that the American government stayed away from Greece and declared a foreign 
policy of neutrality through the Monroe Doctrine for the rest of the 19
th
 century.  These 
actions, rather, benefitted the financial elites that dominated New English shipping 
economy as well as those Americans involved in the Chinese Opium Trade.  
 
 
  
 13 
 
Part I: The Philosophical Foundations 
 
 In many cases, historical actors have some sort of motive and cultural perception 
of the world that inspires their actions. While economic motives have been a powerful 
force, it is far more common to see cultural values and beliefs generally drive human 
action and policy. It is for this reason that America’s treatment of the Greek War for 
Independence was so controversial. Not only was it a matter of favoring one revolution 
over another, but also it was a philosophical crisis rooted in the very founding ideals of 
that nation. The foreign policy of the United States contradicted both the identity of the 
nation and the will of the American people because the American people identified with 
the Greeks and the Greek War for Independence reflected many of the same values 
Americans fought for in the American Revolution. In a way, turning away from the 
Greek cause was the same as rejecting the United States Constitution and the ideals 
expressed during the American Revolution. 
 During the Early American Republic, the influence and spirit of the American 
Revolution was still very much alive and Americans identified themselves with 
Classicism, Classical Liberalism, and Christianity.
 19
 The Founding Fathers had 
constructed the U.S. Constitution with an eye towards Classical Liberalism and ancient 
political theory, and political discourse relied upon references to Classical ideas. 
American farmers (especially those in the American South) emulated the Classics 
through ideas of Roman Pastoralism, and large sections of the American population, 
although not highly educated, were familiar with Classical references because it was a 
                                                        
         
19
 Angelo Repousis, “’The Cause of the Greeks:’ Philadelphia and the Greek War for 
Independence, 1821-1828,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 123, no. 4 
(October 1999): 333-334. 
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part of daily culture. Therefore, the fact that the American government refused to 
formally enter the Greek War for Independence, either as a belligerent nation or as a 
formal economic and diplomatic sponsor, was counter to both the will and identity of the 
American people.  
 To understand how fundamental Classical ideas were to the country and the 
population, one must look to both American education and the foundations of the 
American government itself. According to Carl J. Richard, the Founding Fathers, and 
most well-to-do people in the late 18
th
 to early 19
th
 centuries, were brought up with a 
“Classical Education.” From the age of eight through college, all educated students were 
trained in Greek and Latin, and these students not only read the histories of Livy, 
Plutarch, Xenophon, Virgil, Cicero, and other ancient authors, but also read these works 
in their original language.
20
 Dedicating several hours a day to translation of Latin and 
Greek, the educated became highly skilled in classical languages. It was even a part of 
the curriculum to translate long sections of the New Testament from Koine Greek into 
Latin and/or English.
21
 The Classics, therefore, took on a special meaning to the Founders 
and other educated Americans.  Not only was it the foundation of their education in law, 
grammar, philosophy, history, and ethics, but also it was intimately tied to Christianity in 
the classroom.  
 Knowledge of Classical languages and history was viewed as a necessity for 
entering the middle class and professional occupations. Reverend James Maury, Thomas 
Jefferson’s teacher, wrote “an Acquaintance with the Languages antiently spoken in 
Greece and Italy, is necessary, absolutely necessary, for those who wish to make any 
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reputable Figure in Divinity, Medicine, or Law.”22 This was not just the view of 
intellectuals and the wealthy; in fact, the poor and middle income Americans (especially 
in New England) saw the value of a Classical education as a means of socio-economic 
advancement.
23
 Thus, familiarity with the Ancient World, even if it was minimal, was 
commonplace and a sign of economic advancement.  
 The benefits and influence of a Classical education did not just resonate with the 
generation of the Founders, but also the Founders themselves shaped American society 
and encouraged their successors to embrace the Classics. John Adams ensured that his 
children studied the Classics and made them intimately familiar with history and ancient 
languages. He even went so far as to encourage his grandchildren to study the Classics.
24
 
At the time of Adams’ death in 1826, he had created a Greek and Latin Academy in 
Quincy, Massachusetts.
25
 
 Thomas Jefferson shared a similar enthusiasm for Classics as the basis for 
education. For instance, when Jefferson founded the University of Virginia, he made it a 
requirement that applicants to be intimately familiar with the Classics. This included a 
significant grasp of ancient works, the ability to translate Latin on sight, and a “thorough 
knowledge of Euclid.”26 Other prominent politicians and Founders such as Alexander 
Hamilton, Aaron Burr, George Washington, Henry Clay, James Monroe, George Wythe, 
and others had some level of Classical education and encouraged their peers and children 
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to embrace ancient works.
27
 Thus, the Classics were a central part of both social and 
political discourse well into the Ante Bellum period of the United States. 
 When examining the rhetoric and writings surrounding the Greek conflict at this 
time, it is easy to see how much the Classics influenced the political discourse. In his 
address to Congress in January 1824, Daniel Webster made numerous references to the 
Classics, and he identified with the Ancient Greeks when arguing the case for Greece. 
Specifically, Webster attributes all of modern civilization to the contributions of the 
Ancient Greeks and argues that, if it were not for the Greeks, then the American Republic 
would not exist.
28
 Furthermore, Webster strongly emphasizes that the Classics were a 
cultural and philosophical part of the nation’s very societal foundation and that the 
conflict in Greece was not just some foreign affair. Webster insisted that it was more by 
stating “I wish to treat the subject on such grounds, exclusively, as are truly 
American…”29 This speech was not only evidence that Americans identified with the 
Greeks through the Classics and enlightenment liberalism, but also Americans viewed the 
conflict as a historic tribute to a people that helped inspire the American government. In 
the eyes of Daniel Webster, the Greek War for Independence was an American conflict 
because it resembled the nation’s struggle during the American Revolution and the 
Greeks held many of the same values that helped found the United States. Aside from 
these points on the speech’s content, Webster’s rhetoric also spoke loudly to the 
education and identity of the audience to which he is speaking. Since Webster was able to 
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speak so freely about the Ancient World and make casual references to ancient writings, 
the manner and subject of his words alone indicated that the Classics were commonplace.  
 Each Congressman knew exactly what Webster meant when he said “Even the 
Edifice in which we assemble, these proportioned columns, this ornamented architecture, 
all remind us that Greece existed, and that we, like the rest of mankind, are greatly in her 
debts… we… have inherited this obligation from our ancestors, should now attempt to 
pay it, to those who may seem to have inherited, from their ancestors, a right to receive 
payment.”30 The works of ancient authors were so present in the minds of the people of 
this time that it almost goes without say that each person felt a homage to the ancient past 
and identified their own government and culture with that of the Ancient Greeks. Thus, 
the cause of Greece was not only a revolutionary struggle for the same principles that 
founded America, but it was viewed as an ethical obligation to pay back the ancients by 
aiding their descendants. 
 This admiration of Ancient Greece and a desire to help the descendants of Greek 
heroes was not empty in meaning; the Founding Fathers actively lent advice and 
maintained active correspondence with the Greek Revolutionaries. Thomas Jefferson was 
the most influential of the Founders during the Greek struggle. According to Andrew 
Horton, Jefferson was in contact with Adamontios Korais (Coray is an alternative 
spelling) during the Greek Revolution.  They exchanged ideas that influenced each 
other’s thinking.31 Horton also points out that both Korais and Jefferson were, in many 
respects, close academic peers that exchanged ideas about both Classical Liberalism and 
Classicism. Both were the same age and both received an education that included selected 
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works from Locke, Hobbes, and Voltaire, as well as ancient texts.
32
 In addition, both men 
had a deep interest in the study of languages and each was trained for professional 
occupations with a deep background in the humanities; Korais became a Doctor of 
Medicine and Jefferson became a lawyer.
33
 
 Inspired by Jefferson, Korais reached out to the statesman in 1823 for advice on 
the Revolution and for possible diplomatic aid in helping bring together the Greeks for 
the conflict.
34
 This willingness to correspond with such a high profile stranger 
demonstrates an admiration for America’s Revolution and a feeling of philosophical 
fraternity. Jefferson immediately responded, not with what Korais wanted, but with a 
rather lengthy letter advising the new revolutionary on eventually building his nation.
35
 
Using Classical Liberalism and some examples from the American system, Jefferson 
prescribed a system of government similar to that of a United States state, but adjusted 
liberalism to the unique identity of Greece.
36
 Interestingly, Jefferson’s view of the 
Modern Greek people was tied very closely to their ancient identity. At the end of 
Jefferson’s letter, one can catch a glimpse of Jefferson perception of the Greek people 
"rendered to the names of your Homer, your Demosthenes, and the splendid constellation 
of sages and heroes whose blood is still flowing in your veins."
37
 This exchange 
demonstrates the same view as Webster; the Ancient World was the foundation of United 
States, and the United States views the Greek people as the descendants of these ancient 
people and that the United States should pay homage to them. In addition, there seemed 
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to be this feeling of needing to provide philosophical guidance in classical liberalism by 
speaking extensively on political theory and prescribing a democratic form of 
government best suited for the people of Greece. 
 This sort of philosophical guidance was apparently accepted by the Greeks (at 
least in the case of Korais).  In fact, Korias expressed great gratitude for Jefferson’s 
advice and event sent the former president a copy of Plutarch. These words were not 
empty in meaning.  Korais helped design the Greek Constitution, and he even urged his 
peers to study Thomas Jefferson and the various political works (including the 
Constitution and Bill of Rights) produced during the American Revolution.
38
 
 Horton’s analysis of this exchange understates just how intellectually intimate the 
interchange of ideas were between Korais and Jefferson. At the beginning of one letter, 
Jefferson not only references the copy of Plutarch he had received from Korais, but also 
refers to reading Korais’ translation of Aristotle’s Ethics and how Jefferson utilized a 
modern Greek dictionary to read Korais’ “patriotic” speech to his countrymen.39 This sort 
of academic attention suggests both a real interest on Jefferson’s part and a sort of 
intellectual kinship through both the Classics and Liberalism. Jefferson not only responds 
to this Greek statesman, whom he has never met, but also becomes familiar with his 
work.  The ancient world becomes a common intellectual playground in which both men 
share books and history. Jefferson, having advised Korais on government, even suggested 
the implementation of a classical education system for the Greek Republic. The 
American leader mentioned this education system in the context of describing the 
individual state governments of the United States where public education was made 
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available and each student learns history, Latin, and Greek.
40
 Such an association 
suggests that Jefferson viewed the Classics, not only as a foundational element in 
education, but also as the foundational element in a Republican society. Jefferson 
prescribes the Classics and Liberalism to Greece not just for the sake of revolution, but 
for the goal of creating a self-determined society that has a republic as its form of 
government. This interest in the conflict from one of America’s founders demonstrates an 
intention to promote the spirit of revolution in another country. Furthermore, Jefferson’s 
attentiveness to explaining classical thought and liberal philosophy suggested an 
exchange of ideas that, in the American leader’s view, aimed to support and encourage a 
people that the United States itself took inspiration from for its own revolution.  
 Obviously, Jefferson’s letters and Webster’s speeches, demonstrate that the 
ancient classics were a strong influence upon the middle and upper classes of American 
society. Prominent leaders, elites, and politicians knew their Cicero, Livy, and Herodotus 
as well as their ancient Greek and Latin. Classics were not only a sign of a modern 
education, but knowledge of the Classics served as an essential skill for professionals and 
allowed for socio-economic advancement. It served as an important tool for political 
discourse and it facilitated conversation for both social and intellectual activities. While it 
is easy to assume that the Greek and Roman Classics were limited to only the well-to-do, 
there is strong evidence to suggest that the common man not only understood Classical 
references and ideas, but the Classics were a part of the everyday experience.  
 Sereno Edwards Dwight, a pastor and member of the Boston Greek Committee, 
addressed a crowd in the Park Street Church and the Old South Church in Boston in April 
of 1824. His speech addressed the Greek War for Independence and made the case for 
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aiding the Greeks on the grounds of common religion, the revolutionary spirit, and a 
respect to descendants of the Ancient Greeks. In this speech, Dwight makes casual 
references the Ancient World and talks about historical concepts in a way that requires 
the audience to have some familiarity with historical events. For instance, Dwight says, 
“Fighting alone, at this dreadful disadvantage, amid murders and desolations which have 
made the world turn pale, they have marched forward undismayed, in one firm unbroken 
phalanx, to victory and freedom.”41 This passage compares the Greek struggle to their 
ancient ancestors, using the historical imagery of the ancient Greek phalanx, Dwight not 
only invoked images of the past, but also paralleled the actions of the ancient Greeks with 
the Liberalism and revolutionary spirit of America and Greece. Dwight compared the 
Modern Greek people to the historical hero of Leonidas. This hero also having faced 
overwhelming odds from a Near-Eastern enemy, was depicted as a symbol of Greek 
freedom, and Dwight readily drew this parallel in his speech 
 This sort of casual reference requires a working knowledge of ancient history and, 
to an extent, an understanding of the “Myth of the 300.” Paul Cartledge, a historian of 
Ancient Greek history, explains how the Battle of Thermopylae has been used (and still is 
used) as an important element in literature and history. The facts of the event are distorted 
and given elaboration for dramatic effect, but the “myth” of the event upholds Ancient 
Greek values of combat and virtue. Specifically, not an inch of ground was lost to the 
enemy and that the most honorable death was the one where the soldier lays down his 
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own life defending the state even against the most hopeless of odds.
42
 This concept of 
defending freedom to the end is not unusual, however, our understanding of defending 
freedom has changed since the early 19
th
 century. While the modern person looks to 
contemporary examples and instances from American history, Americans of the early 
19
th
 century looked to the Classics for examples of fighting for freedom. What makes 
Dwight’s reference so telling, is not the fact he was using this specific reference, but that 
this speech was being delivered to a crowd of everyday Bostonians in two churches on 
two different occasions. This suggests that the people of Boston were familiar with 
ancient history and ancient authors, and that there was even a somewhat intellectual 
understanding of literature and ancient cultural concepts. This sort of casual reference in 
a church speech points to an American culture that had been influence by ancient works 
in all areas of society. 
 This single passage was not an anomaly; Dwight spoke several times about the 
Ancient World and further demonstrates the expectation that the audience had some 
familiarity with the Ancient World. In one particular passage, Dwight elaborated on how 
the Greek countryside was “Classic ground,” and how it was the birthplace of freedom.43 
By referring to Greek art, philosophy, and plays, Dwight attempted to illustrate how 
Greece was the cradle of Western culture and that it should be protected. Drawing upon 
the history of countryside and depicting the art of Phidias and Praxiteles, he argued that it 
took Western civilization 2000 years to reclaim such artistic perfection, and that if Greece 
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could achieve freedom, then artistic expression could once again flourish.
44
 These 
illusions not only suggest a working knowledge of Greek history, but also speak to a 
comprehension of Classical art and the various artists throughout the Ancient World. The 
true extent of Classical knowledge that the average Boston layman had is up for debate, 
but what is absolutely certain, as demonstrated by Dwight’s speech, is that there was at 
least a common culture formed around the Classics in America and even the poorest 
citizens had some knowledge of the Ancient World. Furthermore, Dwight’s close 
association of antiquity with freedom and liberty demonstrates that the average citizen 
must have viewed American values and classical liberalism as being related to classical 
republicanism and the values of Ancient Greece and Rome.   
 It seems clear that Classical knowledge was not only a means of economic 
advancement for the common person, but also it was the cultural norm that had 
manifested itself during the American Revolution.
 45
 One way we can see the common 
man utilizing ancient references and labels into their everyday life was through the lenses 
of slavery. In the 18
th
 century, middle-class and poor slave owners frequently named their 
slaves after historical figures from Greece and Rome. Run-a-way slave advertisements 
provide a glimpse into this era and demonstrate that the connection to Classical culture 
continued up until the close of the 18
th
 century. In one case, a run-away slave in 1782 was 
named Caesar.
46
 In 1799, another run-away slave went by the same name.
47
 When 
slavery was abolished in the North by 1800, run-away slave articles ended in northern 
publications. While the inhuman practice was finally abolished in the North, it 
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demonstrated that Classicism in America continued (at least in the North) up to the close 
of the 18
th
 Century.  
In order to understand the extent to which slave owners named their slaves with 
ancient names, one must look further into the actual records that feature the known names 
of thousands of slaves. The Virginia Historical Society’s Unknown No Longer database 
contains the names of over 1,500 slaves and encompasses documents that range from the 
mid-18
th
 century up until the American Civil War.
48
 Using twenty-four Ancient Greek 
and Roman names, I searched the database and did a random sampling of how many 
slaves in Virginia’s Ante Bellum South were recorded to have had a Classically inspired 
name.
49
 Approximately ninety-eight slaves were found in the database that contained one 
of the twenty-four names used, the most popular male names were Cato and Pompey, 
each with five hits, and the most popular name for the women (and overall) was Phyllis 
with twenty-five hits. Two of the slaves found in the database were actually owned by 
two of the Founding Fathers, Thomas Jefferson and George Washington.
50
 The names of 
the slaves were Julius and Minerva; it seems that Minerva was the illegitimate daughter 
of Thomas Jefferson. The sample collected proves that, at least, one out of every fifteen 
slaves in the Commonwealth of Virginia during the Ante Bellum period (roughly 7% of 
the population) had a name that was of either Greek or Roman origin.  
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According to Peter Kolchin, Classical names were common during the late 18
th
 
century and early 19
th
 century, composing of 21% of the population in the Carolinas in 
1750, and 14% of the population in the same states in 1809.
51
 While the use of Classical 
names decreased over time, it still remained prevalent during America’s age of Neo-
Classicism and seemed to only decrease as the traditional education in the Classics 
slowly became less prevalent by the mid-19
th
 century. The South continued slavery until 
the end of the Civil War and also proved to be one of the most Classically oriented 
populations in the United States as southerners used the ancient texts to justify slavery as 
well as adopt the ideas of Classical Pastoralism.  
 Southerners specifically relied upon Aristotle to justify their view and argued that 
the Aristotelian belief of “some were born to follow, while others were naturally meant to 
lead” supported the institution of slavery.52 Classical Pastoralism also pushed forth the 
idea of an agrarian nation and Southern plantation owners jumped upon this concept for 
defining themselves and justifying their occupation. Northerners, however, were not 
unaffected by the ideas of Classical Pastoralism; they too were heavily dependent on 
agriculture during the early years of the Republic and latched onto the same ideas, but not 
to the same degree as their Southern counterparts. Classical Pastoralism, as expressed by 
Virgil, emulated the idea that virtue and republican values came from one’s mastery over 
one’s farm and that the backbone of a society came from its farms.53 Americans adopted 
the same mentality and added late 18
th
 century economic theory and political ideology. 
Laissez-faire economics and free market capitalism were the preferred economic systems 
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of the country, in fact, to many of the Founders and economic theorists, this form of 
economy protected the agricultural lifestyle of America.
54
 Jefferson’s acquisition of 
territory under the Louisiana Purchase, although he himself viewed it as unconstitutional, 
allowed for the expansion of the agricultural society. Consistent with Jefferson’s belief in 
Classical Pastoralism, the acquisition of this territory gave longevity to Republican 
virtues.
55
 Therefore, the more land and individual economic opportunity there was in the 
young Republic, the stronger American virtues and the Free Market system would 
become to defend these values.  
Classical Pastoralism was so ingrained into Jefferson’s mind that on occasion he chose 
to go against the founding principles of the nation as laid out in the United States 
Constitution. Instead he upheld an archaic ideology, which was based more in belief than 
fact, so as to create what he envisioned as an ancient agrarian utopia. Therefore, it is 
shocking to see that, only twenty years after the Louisiana Purchase, prominent and 
Classically minded leaders would betray both ancient and American principles to serve 
the financial needs of a handful of individuals. This, of course, refers to the way in which 
politicians were influenced by greedy merchants to forgo involvement in the Greek War 
for Independence. 
It can be argued that, perhaps, America during the 1820s had moved away from 
ancient pastoralism and had begun to embrace industrialism and Manifest Destiny. 
Evidence, however, suggests that Pastoralism was still very much a part of American 
culture in the Northern states. Dwight, in his 1824 speech, lauds the Greek countryside 
and describes its agricultural lands with admiration. He views the geography of the 
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country as almost paradise-like. Looking to its strategic advantages and its historic 
neighbors, Dwight stated that it was obvious that Greece was the birthplace of democracy 
and the home of historic people and events.
56
 It is clear that the words of Virgil and 
Horace still resonated in the minds of everyday Americans, and that it was rich and 
prosperous farm land that made the ideal society. If America could so easily relate to and 
admire the Greek people on their history and agriculture alone, then why did America 
refuse to aid its revolutionary brother? 
During the Ante Bellum period, Americans viewed themselves in a variety of ways, 
and most of these identities could easily be likened to the Greeks and their Revolution. If 
the uneducated American could not find commonality with the Greeks through the 
Ancients, he/she could look to the ideals of the American Revolution for this shared 
heritage. According to Edward Earle, at the beginning of the Greek War for 
Independence the Messenian Senate at Calamata made a direct appeal to the people of the 
United States using the pursuit of liberty, freedom, and virtue as relatable ideals that 
founded not only the American Revolution, but also the growing Greek Revolution. The 
appeal did not fall upon deaf ears. Not only did it reach the masses, but also it made its 
way to Edward Everett and John Quincy Adams.
57
 The public response burst from the 
heart of the American Revolution, the people were flattered and excited at how the 
Greeks turned to the United States as a model of “civil and religious liberty.” Everett 
viewed the Greeks as fellow “patriots,” and President Monroe encouraged the country in 
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its quest for liberty and independence.
58
 Thus, the Greek cause proved to be the catalyst 
of the American spirit, people echoed the philosophy of the American Revolution, lauded 
the virtues of democracy, and the love of liberty was all but dominant on the streets of the 
country. While the Classics appealed to the mind, culture, and heritage of the United 
States, it was Classical Liberalism that pulled at the heart and passion of the young 
nation.  
Dwight, in his 1824 address, spoke to the common people of Boston and argued that 
the Greek people were expert capitalists and, despite the violation of their unalienable 
rights, they were still able to overcome the Turkish mercantile oppression and fight for 
their liberty: 
In Greece, it [Greek economic liberty] has flourished in spite of opposition and 
rapacity. Those who engage in it are pillaged by the Turkish governors, are 
defrauded with impunity by the Turkish Merchants, and exposed by their very 
success to the loss of liberty, property and life. Yet thus pillaged, thus defrauded, 
they have extended it, with unbending resolution and increasing activity, until it 
covers all the shores and harbours… while their seamen are celebrated 
throughout the Mediterranean for the dexterity with which they manage their 
ships. It is owing to these causes, that… they have been the common carriers of 
the surrounding world, and have engrossed in their own hands almost all its local 
commerce.”59 
 
Harkening to foundational ideas of the Social Contract and Unalienable Rights, as 
formulated by Rousseau, Locke, and Hobbes, which were important in the American 
Revolution, Dwight maintained that the Greek people’s rights were being violated and 
they were yearning to rewrite the Social Contract. Furthermore, he pointed to economic 
oppression and likened the Turkish oppression to the mercantile system America freed 
itself from, and, like the late Colonial economy, credited the Greek people with a natural 
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skill and desire for a Free Market economy. To Dwight and the people of Boston, the 
people of Greece faced the same exact challenge and were almost “indistinguishable” 
from those Revolutionary Bostonians.  
To further this parallel, Dwight stated that the people of Greece have long yearned 
for liberty and, for centuries, have been oppressed by the Turks. Despite this desire, the 
Greeks faced an oppressor that was not 3000 miles away, like the British, but rather one 
that is right next-door. This direct subjugation, as a result, had always swiftly prevented 
any Greek rebellion from escalating to revolution. It was because of this that the Greek 
quest for liberty was so dire and it had almost been physically impossible to shake off the 
Turkish yoke of tyranny.
60
 Thus, Dwight argued that the Greeks cannot achieve their 
independence on their own and that help from their ideological brethren was key. Dwight 
even went as far to plant slogans into his speech that echoed the battle cries of the 
Revolution, in this case “We will be free; or we will perish,” instead of “give me liberty 
or give me death.”61 
As previously discussed, Jefferson also viewed the Greek struggle in both the light 
of Classics and as a revolution similar to the American cause. In Jefferson’s 1823 letter, 
not only did Jefferson prescribe the need for a liberal Greek constitution based upon one 
of the United States’ states, but also recommended that the Greeks uphold the Social 
Contract and ensure that the freedoms of speech, assembly, the press, religion, and a trial 
by jury be protected.
62
 Therefore, not only was this patriotism felt by the common man, 
but also even the Founding Fathers felt a philosophical kinship with the Greek people.  
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This shared patriotism was even echoed in the rotunda of the Capital Building 
when Daniel Webster argued that America has played a part in the revolutions in Europe 
and that now the Greek people are clamoring for liberty. Furthermore, Webster said that 
America should not only encourage such movements but also “go to prostate the liberties 
of the entire civilized world, whether existing under an absolute, a monarchal, or a 
republican form of government. They are doctrines which have been conceived with 
sagacity, they are pursued with unbroken perseverance, and they bring to support, a 
million and a half of bayonets.”63 Thus, Webster argued that it was almost a civilized 
duty on the part of the United States to spread liberty through encouraging and 
participating in revolutionary movements in other nations, in this case Greece.  
Endless examples of state resolutions, local speeches, and organizations dedicated 
to supporting the Greeks all professed support for the liberty of other nations. These 
organized proclamations throughout the country not only justified their support through 
the ideals of the American Revolution, but also viewed the Greeks as fellow patriots 
fighting the same fight America did several years ago. What is certain is that every 
political organization, prominent individual, and (to an extent) every citizen found cause 
through their similarities with the Greeks in Classical influence and ideals of the 
Revolution. Alongside the rhetoric of Revolution and the Classical world, many of the 
accounts also distinguish the cause as a Christian duty. Specifically, they viewed the need 
to support the Greeks as both a religious obligation and as an act of charity because of the 
common belief in a similar religion. Again, all levels of society seemed to share this view 
and, in some cases, seemed entirely interwoven with Revolutionary ideas and/or Classical 
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thought. Repousis argues that several Americans viewed the conflict as both a 
humanitarian cause and as a holy war because the Greeks were fellow Christians.
64
 Earle 
further postulates that the war was viewed as a fight against the spread of Islam, as well 
as a struggle for religious liberty for fellow Christians.
65
 
This sort of religious and Christian liberation is downplayed by both Repousis and 
Earle. In fact, the feelings of religious brotherhood and crusading were almost fanatical 
and imperialistic in nature. Americans did not just view aiding this cause as a duty, but 
rather viewed it as a holy obligation. Jonathan P. Miller, a military volunteer from the 
United States that fought alongside the Greeks, wrote, “If there was ever a country, that 
called for the charities of the Christian world, that country is Greece.”66 In this respect, 
Miller saw the Greek War for Independence as a type of Christian charity; it was a sacred 
“good deed” to help another Christian nation. Furthermore, this passage implies that 
Christian nations should feel morally obligated to help the Greeks out of both charity and 
common Christianity. George Jarvis, another volunteer on the Greek front, also viewed 
the Greeks as Christian brothers and saw the cause as a noble one. What is most 
interesting about Jarvis’ view, in contrast with Miller, is the lumping of liberty, 
Classicism, and Christianity all together when explaining the nobility in fighting for the 
Greek cause.
67
 Jarvis described his Greek brothers-in-arms as “patriotic and brave” and 
described their efforts in the war as “principled achievements.” In this context, Jarvis was 
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describing their revolutionary spirit and noticed the makings of liberty in the Greek 
people. Directly after this statement, Jarvis also described his efforts in the war and 
specifically cited helping fellow “Christian fugitives” captured by the Turks. Most 
interestingly, Jarvis mentions how the Greeks reminded him of their forefathers, in this 
context we can only assume that Jarvis was referring to Ancient Greece.
68
  
This referencing to the Classics, Christianity, and the American Revolution reveals 
some important clues to how many Americans viewed the world and the Greek cause. 
First, the Americans engaged in the issue of Greek Independence had an expectation or 
picture of what the Greek people were and often attributed the actions of the Greeks to 
this idealized image that was formulated in the American imagination. Second, not only 
did Americans view the Greeks through the lenses of Christianity, Classicism, and 
Liberalism, but also these interpretations seemed to be one in the same and entirely 
interdependent.  
To understand how intimately each one of these perspectives depended on each 
other, one must understand how the ideology Orientalized the Greeks when faced with 
something the Greeks did or believed that was in utter contrast to the American 
perception of them. For instance, Col. Jarvis discussed the strange religious practices of 
the Greeks and found their veneration of saints to be both foolish and “erroneous” in the 
practice of worshiping God.
69
 Ironically, Jarvis retracted the statement and argued that 
liberty and science were opening up their minds. Therefore, Jarvis makes the assertion 
that the virtues of the Enlightenment and Liberalism will “civilize them” and correct 
them in their religious practices. In context, the United States at this time was largely 
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Protestant and tended to assume Christians should conform to a certain set of beliefs. The 
Greeks, who practice Orthodox Christianity, have a completely different set of practices 
that most Americans were not familiar with. As is consistent with Edward Said’s theory 
on Orientalism, Americans used their historical knowledge of Ancient Greece, their 
experience in forming a government based on Liberalism, and their own view of what 
qualifies as “proper Christianity” to impose certain assumptions about the people of 
Greece.
70
 Essentially, this assumed authority placed itself as the standard of “civilization” 
and characterized other cultures based upon how similar or different they were from the 
imposing culture. In the case of Americans interpreting modern day Greeks, they saw 
“potential for civilization” and therefore identified with the Greeks while aiming to 
“correct” certain characteristics of their culture. Jarvis, Miller, and, most especially, 
Dwight all impose their own views on the Greeks and the potential of a successful 
independence movement. 
Jarvis was convinced that the American system was the correct and “civilized” 
way of life, he explained that there was much potential in the people of Greece and they 
could soon join the civilized nations of the world. Jarvis argued that, through the 
ideological guidance of Americans and the work of Protestant missionaries, the Greek 
people would adopt American and proper Christian customs.
71
 Furthermore, if the Greeks 
assimilate to the “civilized” lifestyle and beliefs of America, then Christianity could 
spread throughout the world. This sort of assumption and ideological narrowness not only 
demonstrates how Americans viewed Western ideas as being “superior” and civilizing at 
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this time, but also demonstrate that many Americans viewed Christianity, Classics, and 
Liberalism as interdependent ideologies that helped spawn the other. In Jarvis’ mind and 
the minds of many other Americans during this time, Liberalism, the Classics, and 
Christianity were a civilizing force. While his Greek contemporaries practiced a different 
form of Christianity, he believed Liberalism and the Classics would encourage them to 
become “civilized.” 
Dwight further mixed these three areas by placing Christianity into an Ancient 
context and demonstrated the most Orientalized perspective of the different accounts. At 
one point Dwight attributed the entire intellectual and artistic progress of Europe to the 
works and creativity of the Ancient Greeks. Pointing to Euclid, Aristotle, Solon, 
Lycurgus, Homer, Pindar, Leonidas, and many others, Dwight argued that the science of 
law, cultural values, government, philosophy, and literature all have their beginnings in 
Greece.
72
 In the same address, however, Dwight linked Greek culture to modern 
Christianity. Specifically, he referenced how Koine Greek was the original language of 
the New Testament, how Constantine declared the Roman Empire Christian from the 
Eastern capital city of Constantinople, and how the Greek people have always been the 
gateway to Christendom and have always fought off Islamic invaders.
73
 Furthermore, 
Dwight envisioned an expanding Christian nation and used Ancient geographic 
landmarks, such as the Danube River, Asia Minor, and Damascus to mix both religion 
and the ancient world into one vision.
74
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Dwight further described Christianity and Liberalism as a “uniting” force that will 
start from Greece. In fact, he looks to the Serbians, Moldavians, and other Eastern 
Europeans and sees them as people “ripe for revolt” and professing the “Greek Religion.” 
Dwight implies that these people had lacked direction with their efforts and would be 
quick to violence. Dwight believed that only Greece, the genesis of civilization, could 
give the nations of Eastern Europe direction toward progress. It is through a common 
faith and embrace of liberty that the Greeks could bring Eastern Europeans into the fold 
of modern Christendom.
75
 
Dwight did not stop at Europe. By combining Liberalism and the spreading of 
Christendom, he envisions how Greece “will rise up and send forth her own evangelists 
to visit other climes.”76 Essentially, Dwight described a crusade based in Christianity and 
Liberalism that would start from Greece and spread throughout the Middle East and 
Southeastern Europe. Dwight believed revolution after revolution would spread from 
Turkey to Palestine to Egypt and to the Mesopotamian River. Not only would each of the 
people in these countries adopt Liberalism and Liberty, but also they would drop 
“Mohammudism” in exchange for Christianity. In this “liberating” process various sects 
of Christianity will rise up and rejoin “Modern Christendom,” such as Coptic Armenians 
and Syrians.
77
 Needless to say, Dwight had a narrow view of the world and, to a degree, 
was an ideologue. So strongly did he believe that Christianity, Liberalism, and Classicism 
were interdependent and a civilizing force that he “knew” Christianity would spread 
across the Middle East if the Greek Revolution was successful. To Dwight, if a nation 
had all three qualities, it would be impossible for its neighbors to resist joining 
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Christendom through revolution. Dwight’s perspective follows Said’s description of 
Orientalism and how there is a self-justification on the interfering culture’s part to 
“deliver civilization” to the “lesser culture” and, with their guidance, they would guide 
the rest of the region toward civilization.
78
 In Dwight’s world-view, the introduction of 
Liberalism, Protestantism, and Classicism by Americans into the country of Greece will 
cause a “domino effect” and, because the combination of all three aspects of American 
society are so “civilizing,” a massive wave of revolutions would sweep across the Middle 
East and South Eastern Europe.  
What is most revealing about this passage is not the content, per se, but rather the 
intended audience of this speech. The fact that Dwight referred to both Classical and 
Christian ideas in the same breath demonstrates an assumed co-dependence; both feed off 
each other and are jointly civilizing forces. The audience, the common people of Boston, 
both knew and accepted this. In their minds, it seems that all three of these ideas went 
hand in hand, and that a Liberal Crusade across the Middle East seemed both highly 
appealing and logical. Significantly, this demonstrates that, a large portion of American 
society, to an extent, identified with the ideas of the Revolution, Liberalism, and 
Classicism. They not only understood the basics of most ideas, but also they viewed each 
of these concepts as one in the same, each inspiring the other. To Ante Bellum America, 
civilization and the ideals of American society were built upon the literature and history 
of the Ancients, one’s faith in Christ, and the spirit of the Revolution. Thus, it was not 
only one of the interests of the American public to be involved, but also it was a cultural 
obligation that touched the very core of the American identity. 
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Part II: Sacrifices for the Cause and the Issue with the Monroe Doctrine 
 
American interest in the Greek War for Independence went beyond a simple 
political infatuation. American sympathy was so strong that, even when formal 
diplomatic action failed at the federal level, individuals and organizations invested 
themselves into the Greek cause. Veterans and active soldiers volunteered to fight 
alongside their Greek brethren, and influential public figures and intellectuals founded 
and led organizations that brought aid to Greece. Those that lacked the financial, 
political, or personal capacity to volunteer contributed what they could from their own 
funds and resources to aid in the cause. Local and state governments made impassioned 
resolutions that urged Congress to get involved. These municipalities even passed bills to 
send local and state funds to assist in the Greek cause. On the federal level, the topic was 
hotly contested, and prominent politicians, specifically Henry Clay and Daniel Webster, 
made some of the most eloquent speeches and arguments that ever echoed in the Capital 
Rotunda.  
Despite the strong advocacy of individuals, organizations, and state governments, 
the formal resolution to support the war died on the House floor. On the surface, 
diplomatic obligations and the Monroe Doctrine were blamed for the death of the bill, 
but, upon closer examination, it becomes evident that behind the scenes it was a different 
story. Webster, a staunch advocate for the conflict, suddenly backed down and allowed 
the resolution to fizzle. President Monroe was conflicted on the Greek War for 
Independence and held off on showing full support or neutrality for a long period of time. 
When the decision was make, conveniently, John Quincy Adams (an open opponent to 
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the conflict) proved to be the one that finally convinced the President to forgo the 
conflict. Through the examination of the financial and personal relations of the politicians 
involved in making the final decision, it becomes evident that personal agendas, rather 
than the best interest of the nation or the Greeks, directed American foreign policy.  
While the fate of a nation was decided in the backrooms of the legislature, 
everyday American men and women willingly sacrificed their time and money for the 
Greek cause. For instance, Dr. Samuel G. Howe, a prominent Boston physician, 
volunteered to serve in the Greek army and helped care for the wounded on the 
battlefield. His assistance proved to be a crucial factor in maintaining the Greek cause, as 
he served as both a medic and as an officer. Eventually, he became the surgeon general 
for the Greek Navy, and became an active supporter of the Greeks after returning to 
Boston. There, he both raised money and directed resources for the Greek relief effort.
79
 
Howe was not the only American to serve alongside the Greeks—George Wilson of 
Providence, Rhode Island and James Williams of Baltimore, Maryland served with honor 
in the Greek navy. Wilson was noted as a sharp gunner, and Williams served with a 
“calm and heroic spirit,” despite suffering broken limbs in combat.80 American 
volunteers not only supplied extra manpower and medical assistance, but they also served 
as battle-hardened commanders. In particular, Jonathan Miller, a veteran of the War of 
1812, provided both leadership and experience on the frontlines.
81
 Miller also served as 
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an agent for relief organizations and provided information to the Greek Committee in 
Boston.
82
  
While some Americans served directly with Greek forces, others acted on behalf of 
organizations such as Greek Independence Committees, churches, and even state and 
local government. Serving as informants and observers, these individuals let their fellow 
Americans know the progress of the war and what supplies were needed on the frontlines. 
Jonathan Miller was not the only American to do this—George Jarvis corresponded with 
the Greek Committee. He informed them of the conditions in Greece, and made 
recommendations on both appropriate supplies and effective interactions with Greek 
soldiers.
83
 Furthermore, Jarvis made recommendations to the Greek Committee about 
who should volunteer for the cause—qualified individuals, not just adventure-seeking 
fighters. Specifically, Jarvis recommended that volunteers be completely independent, 
accustomed to working in hard conditions, willing to learn the language and customs of 
the Greeks, “be of sound character, and be willing to take on the cause as almost a sacred 
pledge, and willingly suffer for it while forgoing private interests.”84 
Jarvis and Miller’s near-constant line of communication with the Greek Committee 
in Boston demonstrates that this American organization was essentially “waging war” 
and attending to the responsibilities of the state. Their effort required an excellent flow of 
information in order to properly distribute resources to the frontlines. Miller, Howe, and 
Jarvis also required continual funding from the Greek Committee of Boston just to meet 
the essentials of food, clothing, and ammunition.  
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Greek Committee members relied upon donations and fundraising to meet these 
needs, Edward Everett, a leading member of the committee, routinely reached out to 
wealthy individuals for aid. In one letter to Col. Thomas H. Perkins, Everett asks that 
Perkins support Dr. Howe and explains that Everett has already given so much to the 
cause that he is unable to extend his resources. Offering reimbursement to Col. Perkins, 
Everett politely begs for his assistance in aiding this volunteer in Greece.
85
  
Everett and others of the Greek Committee also contacted captains, commodores, 
and sailors to ask for their aid in delivering donations and resources to the volunteers in 
Greece. In a letter to Commodore Rodgers, Edward asks if the Commodore would look 
after cargo being sent to Greece, and see to it that the ship carrying the cargo fell under 
his command. Furthermore, Everett attempts to appeal to Rodgers’ faith by pointing to 
the “fellow men and fellow Christians in Greece.”86  As discussed in Part I, this sort of 
philosophical and cultural appeal is evidence of how meaningful the conflict was to the 
American mindset at the time. Furthermore, the Christian brotherhood, as well as the 
brutality of the conflict, made the Greek conflict a humanitarian cause. Not only was the 
Greek Revolution understood as a political cause, but also it was accepted as a moral 
obligation that appealed to all members of American society. This letter proves that not 
only did this committee and several others, including New York and Philadelphia, raise 
the funds to fight the conflict as though they were at war, but they also attempted to 
facilitate the transportation and safe passage of goods to their “soldiers” in Greece.  
                                                        
       
85
 Edward Everett to Col. Thomas H. Perkins, 27 December 1826, box 2 folder 7, Thomas 
Handasyd Perkins Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, MA.  
       
86
 Edward Everett to Commodore John Rodgers, 3 March 1827, in America in Greece: A 
traditional Policy, ed. David M. Robinson (New York, NY: Anatolia Press, 1948), 58.  
 41 
 
These Greek Committees even appealed to national politicians for financial 
support. In one case, the Greek Committee of Boston sent a letter to President John 
Quincy Adams asking for the government to send money to Captain Jonathan Miller, 
fighting in Greece.
87
 What makes this appeal unique was its personal connection between 
the President and a member of the Committee, specifically Edward Everett. Both 
politicians were Boston born and bred, and both participated in the same political circles, 
specifically the Federalist Party, and what would eventually become the Whig Party. 
During the 1828 election, Everett served as an advocate for Adams and worked with 
Daniel Webster to push forward a strong campaign for the incumbent president.
88
 Everett 
was also a U.S. Congressman for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in 1824 and he 
was active in Bostonian society leading up to his election. It is be highly unlikely that 
John Quincy Adams would not have been acquainted with Everett prior to his election to 
office.  
An example that gives us a glimpse into the closeness of the relationship between 
these two men is during John Quincy Adams’ funeral in 1848. Everett, then not elected to 
any office, delivered the eulogy on John Quincy Adams and his character at the former 
President’s funeral, demonstrating both a professional and personal relationship between 
both politicians.
89
 Despite John Quincy Adams’ opposition to the war, Everett was able 
to call upon a personal and political relationship to ask for aid to the conflict. The 
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members of these committees, similarly, called upon their personal and political 
connections to ask for support.  
While these efforts had success in bringing aid to the Greeks, the cost on of the 
Greek committees, individuals, and other politically motivated organizations had little to 
no pay-back and, more often than not, individuals ended up putting themselves into 
positions that could ruin their lives. American volunteers put their lives on the line and, 
these that survived the war, had sacrificed years of their lives to a cause on the other side 
of the world. Although the people who gathered funds and distributed resources had great 
success, their efforts often experienced financial difficulties and constantly struggled to 
maintain the flow of funds. Even Everett, a moderately well-to-do politician, community 
organizer, and Classical scholar, found that he had overextended himself in support of the 
cause.
90
 Therefore, it is evident that such direct aid to the Greek cause was a personal act 
for many Americans, which demonstrates a sense of common identity with the Greek 
people. Whether it was out of a common Christian belief, ideas of the American 
Revolution, or a sense of indebtedness to the Ancient Greeks, Americans were deeply 
committed to the conflict.  
Boston was not the only city to organize a Greek Committee. The Committee of 
the Greek Fund of the City of New York also supported the conflict. Much like the 
statements given by Dwight and Everett on the conflict (both were members of the 
Boston Committee), this Greek committee in New York saw the war as a Christian duty, 
something in line with the ideas of the American Revolution, and an obligation to repay 
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the Ancients.
91
 Philadelphia also formed its own committee to support the conflict, and 
was followed by other cities across the United States. Both private citizens and local 
organizations across the country published articles in newspapers that championed the 
cause and plead for further assistance for the Greek people.
92
 This widespread show of 
support demonstrates an organic effort on the part of the general public, further 
establishing the importance and political significance of the conflict to everyday 
Americans.  
These efforts did not just stay with private individuals and socio-political 
community organization—they also extended to the operations of local and state 
governments. Citizens of New York, Boston, and other cities signed petitions that urged 
United States Congress to aid the Greek Revolution and to at least recognize the 
independent sovereignty of the Greek people. Furthermore, these petitions used the ideas 
of the American Revolution to justify their position, and they made mention of the 
movements for independence in South America. They cited that Greece and all of these 
other revolutionary movements should be considered as one and the same, as well as 
“equally deserving” of the United States’ support.93  
At the national level, President James Monroe first recognized the cause of the 
Greek people in 1822, and expressed deep philosophical sympathy on the behalf of the 
people of the United States. Citing both the Ancient World and a shared interest in 
liberalism, Monroe made it clear that the United States hoped that the Greek Revolution 
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would succeed.
94
 Local and state governments applauded this sympathy from the 
President and, through the passage of state resolutions, expressed their own sympathy for 
the conflict, and even urged immediate recognition of Greek Independence.
95
 South 
Carolina, Maryland, Kentucky, New York, and several other state legislatures passed 
legislation and resolutions that expressed the same sympathies, each drawing upon the 
Ancient World, Classical Liberalism, and Christianity.  
Some of the strongest advocates for the Greek cause came from city and county 
governments. Poughkeepsie, New York not only demanded that the Greeks receive their 
independence, but also noted common Christian heritage with the Greek people. Also in 
their statement, the people of Poughkeepsie mentioned the assistance of Congressman 
Daniel Webster and how, along with his support, they wanted to extend support to the 
Greek cause. Thus, town and local governments were working with national figures to 
raise awareness of the issue. Moreover, the government of Poughkeepsie ordered and 
appointed a legitimate governmental committee to collect and send aid to the people in 
Greece.
96
 It is clear that even state and local governments were taking legal action to 
assist the Greek cause and committing their own community resources to a foreign cause. 
This movement was not just cultural and the cause of philanthropic organizations, but 
rather a legitimate political issue that was serious enough to yield legislation at the local 
level. 
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The Greek cause inspired political and social organization, for individuals were 
acting both separately and cooperatively to achieve goals. Whether by urging the 
government to take action or acting independently to cause this change, average citizens 
decided to become involved. Churches across the country were taking up collection for 
the Greek cause and dedicating crosses to the people in Greece. College students at Yale, 
Columbia, Brown, and several other major institutions ran fundraisers for the Greek 
people.
97
 The numerous Greek Committees across the country, which were started or 
inspired by Everett, Webster, and others, distributed pamphlets, threw countless balls and 
fundraising parties, and hosted auctions for the cause.
98
 Private individuals also sent aid 
through the Greek Committees; among them were students that donated their money, 
workers that reserved part of their paychecks for the Greeks, merchants that committed a 
percentage of their profits to Greece, and ship owners that designated cargo space on 
their vessels for resources that were to be sent to Greece.
99
 Nearly every segment of 
American society donated to the cause, and political debates and discussions on the issue 
were commonplace. There was not a major city in America that did not have some sort of 
Greek committee and program (whether it was event or donation system) committing 
resources to the Greek War for Independence.
100
 
Thus, it is irrefutable that the American people from all segments of society were 
not only philosophically supportive of the Greek cause, but also financially committed to 
supporting the Greek people. The will of the people was clear—Greece was an ally, and 
the United States citizenry was willing to put their lives on the line for her people. In light 
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of this, it is a paradox that the United States kept out of this conflict and did not even 
formally recognize the independence of Greece until the War ended. Did not the 
government of the United States represent the will of the people? What happened and 
why did formal recognition fail? Most historians have attributed this failure to the 
Monroe Doctrine and John Quincy Adams’ political ties.  
Traditionally, historians have pointed to Monroe’s mention of Greece, the 
remaining South American colonies, and the new Latin American Republics in his 1823 
speech as the reason federal support of the Greek War of Independence failed.
101
 In 
Monroe’s address, Greece is regarded with little actual commitment. Although the United 
States hoped and wished the Greeks would become independent, Monroe neither 
recognized an actual Greek sovereignty nor implied any action on the part of the United 
States.
102
 Monroe, rather, justified that Greece’s effort has already made it impossible for 
the Turks to regain full control of the country. He added that there were no other nations 
opposing Greek independence and, in fact, most European powers had already endorsed 
the movement and offered support, thus it was not necessary for the United States to 
become involved.
103
 Immediately after this statement, Monroe made it clear that Europe 
should stay out of the Western Hemisphere and no longer pursue colonial expansion. 
Moreover, Monroe recognized the independent South American governments and viewed 
them as being “now and forever free.” Nevertheless, in the same breath, the President 
also promised to not interfere into any current colonial possessions in the Western 
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Hemisphere.
104
 When one considers how Monroe expected to treat European affairs, the 
President said:  
Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of 
the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, 
nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal 
concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as 
the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, 
and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, 
meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to 
injuries from none.105 
 
Essentially, Monroe declared Europe as forever “off limits” and that the only concern 
of the United States should be the Western Hemisphere. Historians, especially 
Kaplan, have traditionally pointed to this passage in the Monroe Doctrine as the 
reason for staying out of the Greek War for Independence and have argued it as a 
matter of “diplomatic principle.”106 In essence, if the United States were to get 
involved in Europe then it would give European powers license to interfere in the 
Western Hemisphere.  
 Furthermore, several historians have also argued that there was a political 
dimension to the situation and that John Quincy Adams stood much to lose by 
essentially ruining the “Era of Good Feelings.” The Secretary of State and President, 
John Quincy Adams, was a former Federalist and still had many connections to the 
remaining Federalists in United States politics (i.e. his father and most of his peers 
in Boston). Kaplan has argued that if the United States had become involved in 
Greece that it would have ruined Adam’s chance at the presidency in 1824 and later 
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in 1828.107 Federalists at this time had earned a bad reputation from the War of 
1812 with their secession attempt and subtle aid to the invading British. In the 
Greek War for Independence, the British were assisting the Greeks. In the eyes of 
Adams and many Americans, jumping into a foreign conflict on the side of an enemy 
you just finished a war with was, in Adams’ view, political suicide and had a bitter 
taste of treason.108 Using his influence on Monroe and his position in the 
government, Adams steered the country away from the conflict and ensured his 
viability in the next election.  
 Historians have also argued that both economic and diplomatic concerns 
pushed the young nation to avoid the conflict. Since, John Quincy Adams (maybe out 
of his own political needs) discouraged any action, as he feared it would lead to a 
war with not only Turkey, but also the Barbary States. Facing a war with these two 
states would have brought economic hardship and would have prevented the United 
States from having any access to Mediterranean trade.109 This, of all these different 
interpretations of the reasoning for staying out of the conflict, provides the only 
definitive recorded evidence of John Quincy Adams expressing an actual reason for 
staying out of the conflict. Adams’ reason, beyond any speculation, points to a direct 
economic concern that was both true and potentially damaging. This, however, 
brings into question a rather telling concern about Adams; truly the United States 
economy would have been cut off from the Mediterranean, but was it really such a 
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concern? The United States would have been a part of an entire Naval coalition and 
trade, at least with Western European countries, could have continued. America was 
also conducting trade with the Caribbean, South America, and East Asia, would 
access to the Eastern Mediterranean really have devastated the United States 
economy? The words and actions of John Quincy Adams and other politicians raise 
some concerns and inconsistencies with the typical historical explanation of 
America’s neutrality.  
 In December 1823 and January 1824, immediately following the declaration 
of the Monroe Doctrine, Congress  began a spirited debate on handling the situation 
in Greece. The first step in becoming involved in Greece was recognizing Greek 
sovereignty and appointing a representative or commissioner to the newly formed 
Greek government, in January of 1824 Congress discussed this very issue.110 
According to Chapman, and the speeches from a variety of prominent Congressmen 
at the time, there was passionate support for the Greek cause and key members of 
Congress were all lending support.111 Initially, it seemed that there was significant 
support in Congress and that, instead of tabling the issue as Monroe had suggested 
in his December 2, 1823 speech, Congress would pass legislation to support the 
resolution recognizing Greek sovereignty. Webster and Clay each delivered 
passionate speeches that earned great praise and gave the movement a real shot of 
passing. When it came time to vote, the resolution was formally tabled and, despite 
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earlier passions, Webster and Clay quietly stepped aside and let the resolution die 
on the House Floor.112 Understandably, the resolution had been subtly discouraged 
by Monroe and, in the Era of Good Feelings, the President’s position perhaps deeply 
resonated with members of Congress on both sides of the isle. Webster, however, 
did not give any more fight to the cause and, despite his passionate speech, Webster 
demonstrated only indifference when the bill was killed, what changed his mind 
between his speech and the final vote? 
 Monroe’s dismissal of the bill also raises some questions, on one hand the 
President supported the Greek cause out of the interest of liberalism and thought it 
would not be a major issue if a commissioner was appointed. On the other hand, 
however, he more strongly discouraged the action because the Turks had “forever 
lost dominion” over the region and that there was already enough international 
support to ensure that the Greeks achieved independence, in his mind, it was not 
worth breaking American neutrality.113 Monroe believed that discussion of the issue 
was “important” and that it was symbolic to have a debate in Congress concerning 
the issue.114 This odd explanation does not seem to achieve any clear political 
objective other than raising awareness about the issue. But, if one is intending to 
only have a “discussion,” then why provide the opportunity for it to possibly pass? 
 According to Repousis, Monroe was very divided on the issue of supporting 
Greece and even considered outright recognizing Greek Independence. Adams 
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intervened and swayed Monroe to not outright support their independence but 
rather stick to encouraging the independence of other nations while maintaining a 
non-interference policy.115 This half-committed policy of “supporting without 
supporting” is exceptionally odd and, from the account of several historians, 
indicates that his decisions were easily influence by his cabinet and members of 
Congress. His Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, seemed to have the most 
influence over the President and he was one of the strongest opponents of becoming 
involved in Greece, whether it by military or diplomatic means. All historians that 
have analyzed Monroe’s decision making seem to agree that Adams both influenced 
the President and also opposed the situation in Greece out of some ulterior motive. 
Repousis attributes Adam’s motives to matters of diplomacy and simple economics, 
as well as his own personal political interests.116 Chapman broke from this 
interpretation and linked Adams’ motives to personal financial interests, a free 
market capitalistic ideology, and ties to Col. Perkin’s Opium Trade.117 Chapman’s 
analysis seems to be the most on target, not only was this a clearly confusing 
decision on the President’s part, but also it made very little diplomatic and political 
sense to other European powers. 
 Marquis de Lafayette expressed this bafflement best in a letter to Henry Clay, 
saying that the fight in Greece was a good cause, it adhered to not only fighting for 
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liberalism and protecting Christianity, but also it was a humanitarian cause in light 
of the Turkish atrocities.118 Furthermore, Lafayette said that France, Great Britain, 
and other major Europeans had begun to lend aid; an American presence would not 
be unwelcome.119 Lafayette went on to say:  
I have been anxiously waiting for the arrival of the two private New 
York frigates and persisting in the opinion that the presence of an 
American squadron on those seas affords honorable opportunities, 
consistent with the rules of neutrality, to render essential services. 
And, indeed, such I have found the popular feeling in the United 
States. Such is now the feeling in Europe, that every service rendered 
to those people would be looked upon with very favorable 
constructions.120  
 
Clearly, the actions of the United States were viewed as unusual; France and the rest 
of Europe found the American definition of neutrality as overly cautious. To at least 
Lafayette, the Greek War was a universal cause that all nations should be able to 
agree with and he did not understand why the United States Secretary of State, 
Henry Clay, did not simply send some sort of envoy representing the United States 
government. 
 Aside from this confusion on what exactly America’s position was in the 
conflict and taking up a policy of neutrality, the Secretary of State’s diplomatic 
activity in the Mediterranean in 1825 made the situation more perplexing. The 
diplomatic community was confused as to what exactly the United States meant by 
“neutral.” In October of 1825, Henry Clay, then Secretary of State, sent a 
representative, John Rodgers, to Turkey and Greece to conference with the Ottoman 
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government. Rodgers reported troop positions and recent battles between the 
Greeks and Turks, and described how there is an opportunity to negotiate a trading 
treaty with the Ottoman Sultan.121 Furthermore, Rodgers provided context on the 
current conflict and said that the public was not truly aware of the situation in 
Greece and that the Greeks were hopelessly outmatched.122 This letter is troubling 
because, despite having a supposedly neutral position on the conflict, the Secretary 
of State’s office was closely monitoring the progress of the war and has been talking 
directly with the Ottoman government and their military commanders. Additionally, 
the United States government was exploring trade options with the Turks, and was 
aiming to negotiate an eventual trade treaty. Despite the apparent “neutrality” of the 
United States government, it is highly suspicious that the United States would look 
to monitor a war they swore off, seek a trading presence in the Mediterranean when 
the United States refused to send a ship to protect non-military vessels, and look to 
expand commerce with a country that President Monroe had hoped would lose its 
hold on Greece.  Whatever the true interest of the United States was, it was certainly 
not maintaining neutrality and remaining distant from the conflict. There was, at the 
very least, a deep economic concern about United States commerce with Turkey and 
it seems the United States wanted to protect as well as strengthen its current deals 
with the Ottoman Empire.  
 In fact, evidence suggests that prominent politicians had questionable 
investments that might have incentivized them to strengthen relations with Turkey 
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and avoid the Greek conflict. In a letter from John Quincy Adams to Col. Thomas H. 
Perkins in 1827, the President thanks the merchant for his financial advice, and for 
introducing him to Col. Israel Thorndike. Adams goes on to discuss his appreciation 
for Perkins’ assistance in helping him invest in Thorndike’s business venture, and 
how he values the long friendship he has had with Perkins.123 This letter indicates 
that, despite his job of running the country, Adams was conducting private business 
and had deep financial connections with several Boston merchants and 
businessmen. Furthermore, there was even an indication of a personal relationship 
as Adams referred to Perkins as both a friend and business associate. While, on the 
surface, it seems to not really be a big issue, but it becomes more problematic when 
considering the business and investments in which both Thorndike and Perkins 
were involved.  
 Perkins, for instance, was deeply invested in the Chinese Canton Trade and 
had gradually moved his entire business over to the buying and selling of Opium to 
the Chinese people. He purchased all of his opium from the Ottoman Empire and, by 
1820, depended entirely upon the “good will” of the Turks to continue his 
business.124 In addition to Perkins’ investments, upon closer examination of 
Thorndike, it turns out that both Perkins and Thorndike were long time friends and 
had invested in many projects together, including the local Massachusetts Bay Canal 
Corporation, and the oversea China Trade.125 Thorndike had a flourishing 
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mercantile business between South America and Canton, China, and often used 
Perkins’ ships to move his goods between Canton and other ports of interest.126 
Hence, by all accounts, Perkins and Thorndike appear to be heavily invested in each 
other’s financial success.  
 Since John Quincy Adams seems to have been deeply involved with Perkins 
and Thorndike both socially and financially, his opposition and treatment of the 
Greek War for Independence seems to be guided by personal interests, not by the 
actual needs of the country. When the issue of America’s interest in the War is put 
into question and the relationship between the John Quincy Adams Administration, 
The Ottoman Empire, and the Canton Trade is examined, the entire dynamics of 
American foreign policy change. The traditionally accepted narrative of America’s 
neutrality during the conflict becomes complicated. It becomes less likely the United 
States was trying to uphold the Monroe Doctrine and avoiding war out of the 
interest for diplomatic and political stability. If Adams, the strongest opponent to 
the conflict, was financially connected to the Ottoman Empire, the nation that 
America would have been at odds with, then his foreign policy changes from 
protecting the state to protecting his wallet. Thus does Adams’ involvement with 
Perkins and Thorndike denote a conflict of interest between his personal financial 
stakes and his responsibilities as President of the United States.  
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Part III: Perkins and the Boston Oligarchy  
 
 For one to truly understand the influence Thomas H. Perkins and his associates 
had on government officials and the shaping of American foreign policy, one must 
understand the business and investments of this individual. Col. Thomas Handasyd 
Perkins, born December 15, 1764 and died January 11, 1854, was a member of the 
Boston Brahmin families of Massachusetts during the early years of the United States. He 
was a prominent merchant and businessman that accumulated most of his wealth from the 
Chinese Trade by first selling furs and then opium. Aside from his financial ties, Perkins 
was also a philanthropist and, essentially, a “political boss”. He was also an ardent 
Federalist for most of his life.  
 Col. Thomas Perkins’ business was initially a joint venture between himself and 
his older brother, James Perkins. Their major joint venture was participation in the 
Canton Trade, using investments from Ephraim Bumstead and several others, the 
brothers were able to send a ship in 1803 to Canton and begin trading with the Chinese 
people.
127
 In order to begin a successful trading relationship with Canton, Perkins and his 
investors purchased furs from the American Northwest and additionally used specie (gold 
and silver coinage) to make up any monetary shortcomings. They then shipped the furs 
and specie to Canton to either purchase spices and tea, or sell the furs at a marked up 
price.
128
 This initial investment let the Perkins brothers enter the market and allowed for 
them to accumulate wealth pretty rapidly. In addition, Perkins also worked out of 
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multiple ports, not only was he based in Boston with multiple investors within the 
community, but also he commissioned the ship the Patterson with four other investors 
out of Providence harbor.
129
 Using his nephew (also adopted son), John Cushing, as the 
representative “supercargo” agent in Canton, Col. Thomas Perkins purchased three 
“factories” in Canton to have both a base of operations and a place to store and prepare 
products.
130
 Thus, the entire wealth and operation of Perkins’ company depended upon 
foreign investments and his ability to access them. If Perkins was to lose contact with 
these factories, then he could suffer a possible financial loss. 
 Early in Perkins’ mercantile career, he had a diversified trading system between 
all regions of the world. Despite briefly practicing the slave trade in the late 1790s, 
Perkins mainly traded furs, lumber, flour, fish, horses, and other miscellaneous products 
for various clients.
131
 Essentially, his shipping industry was in the business of moving all 
things around the globe.
132
 Once he had accumulated enough wealth, he and his brother 
decided to focus on a main “staple” and enter the Canton trade with fur. He was only 
further encouraged to do this as trade in the West Indies began to falter and the potential 
return of investment (over a $300,000 investment at the time) in Canton became more 
and more promising.
133
 Thus, at this point in Perkins’ career (1803-1807) his investments 
were diverse and he could rely upon one business venture if the other came up short. 
Perkins developed three main categories of trade: short-term speculation (focusing on 
West Indian trade), medium-term speculation (focusing on Europe and delivering raw or 
finished products), and long-term trade (the China trade, creating a long distance base 
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with long journeys between New England, the Northwest fur trade, and Canton).
134
 It was 
this long-term investment that brought in most of Perkins’ later wealth and would push 
his business to focus primarily on Canton.  
 Perkins’ business in Canton began to change shortly after the War of 1812. 
Noticing a diminishing demand for furs and specie, and a rapid rise in value for opium 
and quicksilver (mercury), Thomas began to follow the market. He selected Turkish 
opium because India had been monopolized by the British and there was a high demand 
for that type of opium in Northern China.
135
 Using the advice of John Perkins Cushing, 
monitoring the situation in Canton, Perkins heavily invested in opium and noticed a 
significant increase in return. This sort of rapid change in trading interests demonstrates 
two important features about Col. Thomas Perkins as a businessman and about his 
business. First, he paid extremely close attention to the market and wanted a completely 
safe return on investment. Opium was a “safe” investment because it was a high demand 
product and other commodities were losing profitability, he wanted to minimize risk. 
Second, Perkins’ further investment into the opium trade and dependence on higher and 
higher profit margins would make it exceedingly difficult for him to withdraw from the 
market if something happened.  
 Another unique consideration of Perkins’ business model is his investment in the 
iron mining industry during the War of 1812. Due to the essential shut down of trade 
because of the British blockade, Perkins was unable to further his business dealings in 
Canton or anywhere else outside of the country. As a result, Perkins was forced into 
“laying by,” essentially resorting to not-so-profitable business ventures within the United 
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States to continue his income.
136
 In Perkins’ case, he decided to invest in the iron mining 
industry in the state of Vermont. It was a grueling task and Perkins was able to yield 
some income, especially from the United States government as the iron he mined was 
used to create cannonballs for the war.
137
 This falling back on crude but ultimately “safe” 
measure for continuing business demonstrates both a weakness in Perkins’ business and a 
personal characteristic of Perkins. First, Perkins’ business was based overseas and he 
depended upon the freedom of sea travel to ensure a profits; any war or trade embargo 
could easily threaten that prosperity. Second, Perkins, like any good businessman, did not 
like uncertainty, and always wanted to be making money, even if it was a small profit. 
His investment in the iron industry was a desperate safety measure that kept him “afloat,” 
and gave him some sort of economic certainty that he could depend upon. 
 This sort of cautionary investing and constant need for certainty can even be 
viewed in his business affiliations and social position in Boston. For instance, the Perkins 
family tended to keep the business a “family business” by either hiring children and other 
relatives or marrying their children into families they regularly did business with. Col. 
Thomas Perkins even made sure that his close family friends and business associates all 
lived in the same neighborhoods in Boston; this familial “grouping” lasted about two 
generations.
138
 
 Perkins and his associates also built a network of familial relations both in 
business and in politics, not only did it ensure trustworthy partners but also it gave 
Perkins the ability to influence Boston society and politics. For instance, Perkins formed 
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several partnerships with the Higgins family, another merchant family in Boston, because 
Thomas’ brother had married into that family.139 Col. Thomas Perkins also secured his 
overseas assets with family members, in Canton John Perkins Cushing served as Perkins’ 
on-the-ground representative that oversaw all transaction. Also, Cushing was Thomas’ 
nephew and Thomas also raised Cushing as an adopted son of sorts.
140
 Senator Harrison 
Gray Otis was a long-time friend of Thomas H. Perkins. They had known each other 
since childhood; both helped each other in both politics and business, especially during 
the attempt to secede.
141
 Thomas H. Perkins Jr. worked on many of his father’s ships and 
eventually took over a large portion of the business along with the Cabots.
142
 Samuel 
Cabot, a prominent business associate, also married Col. Thomas Perkins’ daughter, 
Eliza.
143
 Perkins assigned his brother’s nephew, Frederick Paine, to be a special 
messenger that was to go between Perkins and Cushing. The Cabot family became 
particularly involved with the Perkins family. They formed a formal business partnership 
in 1821 and became joint investors in the textile industry only a few years later.
144
 The 
Thorndike family also became close associates not just through their dealings, but also 
through tight bonds of friendship. Specifically, Thorndike’s son was married to Otis’ 
daughter and therefore made him as equally influential as Perkins when it came to 
national and local politics.
145
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 Perkins had countless connections across Boston both in politics and in business, 
whether it was through mutual friends or direct family ties, Perkins built an “empire” 
through family blood and money. He staffed his business with the only people he could 
trust, his family, and kept his personal ties both happy and close. In fact, Perkins was so 
selective and cautious about whom he trusted that he only placed very close family 
members into managerial positions of his business, such as John Cushing (basically a 
son), Sam Cabot (son-in-law), and T.H. Perkins Jr. (his direct son). Thus, Perkins was a 
businessman that always wanted a safe bet and placed people he could absolutely trust in 
key positions of influence and responsibility.  
 Aside from his familial and friendly ties, Perkins also tended to associate, or at 
least work, with individuals that helped expand his business both financially and 
geographically. The Megee family, for instance, was influential in Rhode Island and had 
some level of control over the goods shipped in and out of Providence harbor. When 
Perkins began to establish the Canton trade, he included William Megee into the 
venture.
146
 The Megee family and Perkins family had a deep personal and business 
relationship; Col. Thomas Perkins and his wife often spent time with William Megee and 
Mrs. Megee while conducting countless deals that spanned over twelve years
147
 Although 
William Megee ended up falling upon hard times, Perkins worked often enough with 
Megee to establish a formal business presence in Providence harbor.
148
 Whether or not 
his relationship with Megee was genuine or simply a means to an end, what can be said 
for certain is that Perkins’ association with Megee extended his financial presence to 
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another state and gave him more economic influence in the region of New England as a 
whole.  
 Perkins also often kept in contact with his competitors. During the early years of 
the Fur and Canton Trade, his rivals were the Lymans and the Lambs.
149
 In 1807, Perkins 
caught word of Theodore Lyman’s potential retirement and Perkins decided to approach 
this competing merchant with a deal. The negotiations proved to be fruitful for Perkins. 
In exchange for $8,000, he received the Lyman’s ship, the Vancouver, and the promise to 
not send any ships to the Northwest.
150
 The Lambs also formed a partnership with the 
Perkins brothers and thus gave Col. Thomas Perkins an essential monopoly over the 
Northwest-Canton fur trade. In addition, it gave Perkins partial dominion over Maine’s 
ports because Lyman was based out of Boston, Massachusetts and York, Maine, and he 
was contemplating retirement.
151
 Thus, through the negotiation of deals as well as 
partnerships and staying in contact with his competition, Perkins was able to expand his 
fleet, compete in Maine, and essentially establish a monopoly on the Canton fur trade in 
New England.  
 Col. Thomas Perkins, through his familial connections, rubbing of elbows, 
strategic partnerships, and friendly relations with other merchant families, established an 
interconnected economic empire that dominated most of New England and reached far 
across the globe. He secured his assets with trusted individuals and backup investments, 
and he always made sure to have someone on the “inside” to advocate for his interests. 
This ruthless and calculated behavior built up Perkins’ wealth and gave him 
unprecedented influence throughout New England. It was by implementing these same 
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techniques and always striving to have a secure and stable future that Perkins expanded 
his influence and power into and throughout politics. This “King of Opium” blurred the 
lines between what was business and what was politics. Using economics to control 
politics and vice versa, Perkins was able to protect and expand his investments, while 
secretly writing public policy that was not in the interest of the general population.  
 Boston’s political structure in the Early Republic was less of a democracy and 
more of an elitist oligarchy where the economically well-to-do and old familial political 
dynasties sat on top. This system thus enabled Perkins to utilize his connections to secure 
his own interests. He also knew how to play the game in Boston politics and even set the 
“rules” that turned Boston into a Federalist stronghold well into the Ante Bellum Period. 
Perkins’ influence was so pervasive that he was able to capture the ear of national 
politicians and bend them to his will.  
 Before discussing the intricacies of Perkins’ political network, it is important to 
note his source of popularity in Boston and how he maintained an “uncontroversial” 
status in the eyes of common Bostonians. Specifically, Col. Thomas Perkins and his 
brother James were generous philanthropists and received much praise from the general 
public of Boston. James and Col. Thomas Perkins were longtime members of the Boston 
Athenaeum and usually helped sponsor various libraries throughout Boston. Upon James’ 
death in 1822, the brothers donated funds to the Boston Athenaeum and even handed 
over James’ old estate to the library so as to better facilitate the growing collection.152 
Due to Perkins’ contributions, the Boston Athenaeum was able to expand, leading to the 
eventual establishment of the Boston Museum of Fine Arts decades later.  
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 In 1825, Perkins decided to help organize and fund the building of the Bunker 
Hill Monument, lending his expertise in finance, Perkins helped plan out the logistics for 
the project. He helped supply the money and got the society to acquire a granite mine to 
fund the project; curiously, he also purchased the mine and built the rail to it.
153
 Perkins 
also assisted the planning of many parades, and even helped host President John Adams 
in 1798 and President James Monroe in 1817.
154
 Philanthropic gestures like these kept 
Perkins uncontroversial and viewed as a good influence on the city of Boston. Not only 
did this benefit Perkins in the public eye, but they also advanced him personally, as he 
gained some profit from the Bunker Hill project and was able to gain access to two sitting 
presidents. 
 Col. Thomas Perkins also served as a public servant; in 1797 he was elected as a 
“fireward” in Boston.155 He served as a “vote distributor” and handed out ballots to voters 
during election time.
156
 This position was a form of open ballot voting, which put voters 
in a situation where their employers could see how they voted. As a result of this lack of 
anonymity, voters were silently coerced into voting against their own interests. Thus was 
Perkins openly participating in an election system that controlled the way people voted. 
 Furthermore, Perkins helped organize and lead a committee that would select 
candidates that would be elected to Boston’s city government. Intriguingly, all of the 
candidates that were selected were Federalists and Perkins was one of these candidates.
157
 
This sort of unusual unanimity for a particular party and the holding of surreptitious 
committees indicate some sort of foul play in the democratic process, and an attempt to 
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dominate the government of Boston, if not Massachusetts. By all accounts, Perkins was 
deeply involved with this committee and the Federalist Party, the faction that seemed to 
be pushing for this dominance. Such a rigging of the democratic process indicates that 
Perkins was primarily interested in protecting his own assets, and was willing to 
manipulate the local government to get his way.  
 Perkins remained a longtime member of the Federalist Party and took on a 
leadership role at several points during his life.  Serving as a member of the Central 
Committee of Massachusetts, Perkins essentially had the power and authority to select 
the members of town committees throughout Massachusetts. Unsurprisingly, the majority 
of representatives sent to the General Court of the commonwealth were Federalists.
158
 
Perkins even ran for a representative position in the state legislature and, predictably, 
won the seat to represent Suffolk County.
159
 This ease in controlling the vote and the 
ability to obtain a political office with little worry demonstrates how powerful and 
influential both Perkins and the elite families of Boston were in the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts. Even in years of unpopularity, the Federalist Party remained in power 
and, as long as Perkins stayed amongst its leading members, he could control the entire 
political structure of the commonwealth.  
 Hence if Perkins was able to influence the Federalist Party, then the question 
becomes what degree of influence did he have? Starting from at least the late 1790s, 
Perkins had access to prominent political figures and was able to help host large events 
on behalf of the Federalist Party. In August of 1798, President John Adams visited 
Boston and was welcomed by prominent members of the Boston community as well as 
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Federalist Party leaders. This welcoming party organized a tour around the town, several 
balls, and a parade in John Adam’s honor. Col. Thomas Perkins was amongst the 
organizers and he lead the parade that honored the President.
160
 Furthermore, the parties 
and celebrations held in honor of the President were described as lavish and lively, to 
Joseph Dennie, the Bostonians celebrated like the French.
161
 This sort of accessibility 
indicates that Perkins, very early on in his life, was prominent enough within the 
Federalist Party to lead a portion of the welcoming celebration for the President.  
 While this passage does not indicate whether or not John Adams knew Perkins at 
the time, there is evidence to suggest that Perkins and Adams had some sort of social 
relationship. In a letter from Adams to Perkins, the former president thanks the merchant 
for his gift of grapes and indicates that there is some sort of friendship between the two 
figures.
162
 Such a letter goes beyond simple political association and indicates at least a 
mildly personal relationship. Thus, Perkins, through this association, had top leadership 
in the Federalist Party and could call out favors from individuals for political reasons.  
 This realization makes it only clearer that Perkins and his close associates, 
specifically H.G. Otis, were political bosses and, through the “Central Committee” 
system, they had engineered the appearance of democracy, but really implemented 
a Federalist Party web of favors.163 Otis, in a letter to Woodbury Storer, indicates 
that they had successfully systemized the Federalist Party into the electoral process 
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and that he viewed democracy as something “wild” that had “cursed the country.”164 
Thus, to Perkins and Otis, democracy was something to be feared because of its 
uncertainty and, if one had the chance, one should seek to manipulate it and permit 
select individuals to run the government. What is more telling about Perkins is his 
placement in this Central Committee system. Since Perkins, Otis, and other 
Federalists organized this system, they actively made sure the Federalists in each 
county of Massachusetts were both represented and had the necessary support.165 
In effect, this active control and support of the Federalist political system in 
Massachusetts made Perkins exceedingly influential. Candidates were approved by 
him, each Federalist politician owed their status to him, and Perkins knew every 
Federalist politician in the commonwealth.  
 This influence was often acted upon by Perkins through punishing and 
rewarding Federalist politicians across the Commonwealth; no office was too big or 
too small for him to influence. In 1807, the Boston Federalists became outraged by 
Jefferson’s Embargo with Europe and, lead by Gore, Otis, Revere, and Perkins, 
gathered prominent members of the party in Fanueil Hall. These members included 
John Adams, John Quincy Adams, Robert Treat Paine, and several others.166 David 
Parish reported how the Boston merchant community was concerned about their 
economic stability, how the China trade was essentially going to be strained, and 
feared further economic stunting because the embargo might plunge the United 
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States into war.167 Perkins, Otis, and the other leaders of the Boston Federalist Party 
had decided to vehemently oppose the embargo and were pushing other members 
of the party to join them. John Quincy Adams disagreed with the Federalist 
leadership and he was essentially ostracized from the party. To add insult to injury, 
John Quincy Adams attended a Democratic-Republican Meeting a few days after the 
event.168 Although Adams rejoined the Federalist after the dispute, Perkins did not 
forget this transgression.  
 In 1808, Perkins and Timothy Pickering decided to support a business 
associate, James Lloyd, for Adams’ seat in Congress. With a simple nod and wink, 
Adams lost his seat and a virtually unknown politician was placed into office. James 
Lloyd was someone Perkins had incorporated into his business practices.169 What 
was most revealing about the transition was not just the fact that it happened to 
John Quincy Adams, the son of a former president and Founding Father, but also the 
way in which this transition was conducted. In a letter from Christopher Gore to 
Rufus King, John Quincy Adams is described as being ignored by his fellow 
Bostonians and essentially becoming alienated.170 Perkins and the Federalist Party 
not only forced Adams from office, but they also turned the population of Boston 
against Adams and ostracized him both socially and politically. This sort of influence 
that Perkins had over someone who was the son of an essential American icon, 
while continuing a cordial relationship with John Adams Sr., is both unprecedented 
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and telling of Perkins power in Massachusetts alone. Perkins had enough influence 
to punish and reward his political peers on a whim, and worked to control key 
politicians so as to protect his business.  
 The Adams family is the best example of this “stick and carrot” relationship, 
and how Perkins kept key figures dependent and grateful for his rewards while 
cautious and heeding of his punishments. In 1827, Adams, Everett, and Webster 
turned to Perkins for political support during the run up to the 1828 election. 
Perkins rewarded the politicians by mobilizing his network of associates, offering 
Adams financial investments, and encouraging the entire Federalist Party to support 
Adams in his re-election.171 This sort of political influence was powerful, Perkins 
had the ability to deliver entire states to presidents in elections and he could easily 
thwart or encourage the rise of any up and coming Massachusetts politician.  
 This influence demanded so much respect that Perkins could command 
national politicians to attend events and ceremonies all while capturing their ear to 
“ask” that they protect a certain aspect of his business empire. For instance, during 
the 1825 ceremony for laying the cornerstone of the Bunker Hill Monument (a 
project that was partly funded by Perkins), President John Quincy Adams became a 
part of the dedication ceremony. He did not serve a central role in the ceremony, but 
rather served as a notable figure to complement the main guest of honor, Marquis 
de Lafayette.172  In 1817, Perkins served as the main welcoming party for the newly 
elected president, James Monroe, during his visit in Boston. Organizing the entire 
                                                        
         
171
 Carl Seaburg and Stanley Patterson, The Merchant Prince of Boston: Colonel T.H. 
Perkins, 1764-1854 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 350-351. 
        
172
 Ibid., 323.  
 70 
 
visit with his Federalist friends, Perkins made speeches welcoming the President to 
Boston and paraded the President around the city.173 Celebrating Independence Day 
with each other and hosting several dinners in Monroe’s honor seemed to be more 
for the benefit of Perkins than Monroe.174 In fact, Perkins even had the honor of 
having President Monroe sit in the same pew as him during Sunday church 
services.175 Ultimately, this grand welcoming turned out to be one giant pitch to the 
President to invest into his iron works in Vermont as well as address other aspects 
concerning Perkins’ business.176  
 Directly after visiting Boston, the President did go to Vermont and stopped 
at the Vergennes iron works that Perkins owned.177 Despite the fanfare, Monroe 
ultimately decided against investing in Perkins’ iron works.178 While Perkins might 
not have received what he wanted, this affair demonstrates just how influential 
Perkins was in the Early Republic. He summoned the President to Boston to both 
listen to a business deal and to use the opportunity to boost his own image in the 
eyes of his fellow Bostonians. This visit to Boston proves that Perkins had the ability 
to affect the federal government and influence national politicians. If such an 
influence were used for purposeful means then Perkins, in theory, could directly 
affect national policy. 
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 Outside of just politics, Perkins also had the ability to influence the judicial 
system and protect individuals that were either important to his business or the 
Federalist Party. For instance, Thomas Oliver Selfridge, a loyal member of the 
Federalist Party and a lawyer in Boston, shot and killed Charles Austin, a 
Democratic-Republican Boston merchant, over a legal dispute that stemmed from 
an unpaid bill at Jefferson’s Tavern, Perkins was able to ensure Selfridge was not 
convicted of this crime.179 According to both Seaburg and the records of the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court, the entire grand jury in Selfridge’s case was 
composed of well-known Federalists.180 Curiously, Thomas H. Perkins, the ipso facto 
leader of the Federalist Party in Boston, was the foreman of the jury in the case.181 
Instead of being tried for murder, Perkins, in his testimony, argued that it might 
qualify as manslaughter and should be considered a case of self-defense.182 The final 
verdict, after fifteen minutes of deliberation, was “not guilty.” How fortunate it was 
for Selfridge that the entire jury seemed to be composed of political allies.183  
 Perhaps it is coincidence that the jury just ended up being composed of 
fellow Federalist and Perkins just so happened to have served on this jury. The 
events surrounding the case, however, seem to suggest that there was something 
intentional going on. When the prosecution placed three people on the stand it 
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seemed almost certain that Selfridge would be convicted. When the defense had its 
turn, they produced twice as many witnesses (all of whom were Federalists) that 
provided testimonies that were completely opposite the prosecution and seemed to 
push toward the notion of “self-defense” on Selfridge’s part.184 Thus, it is almost 
certain that Perkins and the rest of the Federalist Party had mobilized to not only 
protect one of their own but also rig an entire court case. Perkins’ protection of 
Selfridge demonstrates a few important things; first, Perkins had the funds and 
influence to easily rig a court case. Second, the motivation for this help was, at a bare 
minimum, political and a way for Perkins to build up his “clientage.” Selfridge was a 
fellow Federalist with a law degree; this sort of individual could become a great 
asset in politics and, at the very least, Perkins could gain his loyalty to expand his 
own business, and demonstrate to other Federalists the possible rewards Perkins 
could provide, i.e. avoiding prosecution.  
 Another example of Perkins utilizing a system of favors and loyalties was his 
involvement in the Bunker Hill Monument project. Daniel Webster, both a 
Congressman and member of the committee for the project, owed Perkins a large 
debt. Since Webster was thus loyal to Perkins’ wishes, Perkins was able to indirectly 
influence William Tudor, a leading organizer of the monument committee. This gave 
Perkins his proverbial “foot in the door”, enabling him to influence the project.185 
Perkins would not only become one of the key organizers of the project, but also he 
would serve as the main supplier of stone to the monument, thus Perkins was given 
the chance to profit off a philanthropic project.  
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 Specifically, Perkins was able to construct the Granite Railway between the 
quarry and the building site. It was the first railroad in America and a large chunk of 
the funding for this came from the Massachusetts Commonwealth legislature (which 
Perkins was a member of at the time).186 He owned the majority of the shares in the 
railway and eventually expanded parts of the rail system. By no means was this 
railway a great moneymaker for Perkins, but it did bring in a respectable profit for 
the old merchant.187 It seems that whenever Perkins used his resources to help 
other individuals, it was either out of party loyalty and/or the expectation of 
receiving some sort of return favor. Thus, it is not inaccurate to describe Perkins as 
a power broker and financial boss of the entire Boston area, he never did anything 
for free and many of the major projects in the city had to go through him. 
 When considering his involvement in the Greek War for independence, one 
can see same sort of quid pro quo relationship and understand why major 
supporters of the Greek War for Independence suddenly lessened their support for 
the cause. Edward Everett, for example, wrote to Perkins in December of 1823 and, 
despite Perkins having been appointed to the Greek Committee, asked why Perkins 
had published the article “A Merchant” in the Daily Advertiser, in which Perkins 
spoke out against the war anonymously. Everett demanded that Perkins step up his 
contribution to the cause and appealed to their friendship for understanding.188 
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Oddly, Everett felt obligated to co-sign the letter with the rest of the committee 
members and to make the letter “official.” 
 While we do not have the response to this letter, we can only guess that it 
was not favorable, for a letter from a couple of years later demonstrates a very 
different dynamic between these two individuals. In the 1826 letter from Everett to 
Perkins, Everett made some perfunctory statements about “complying with your 
request relative to a Newspaper” and generally discussed matters of state.189 In a 
very roundabout way, Everett brought up the Greek War for Independence and 
asked, point-blank, if Perkins would help donate funds to the Greek cause so as to 
support Dr. Samuel G. Howe, an American volunteer on the Greek frontlines. Everett 
went onto say how he had been drained of his funds and would be willing to 
gradually reimburse Perkins if he were to donate some funds.190 What is most 
shocking about this conversation, aside from the change of tone from upset to 
almost begrudged begging, is that Everett was a United States Congressman at this 
time. Thus, Everett, an elected official that should only be beholden to the public and 
had legal authority, was essentially paying respects to Perkins and seemed quite 
dependent upon his good will. Clearly affected by the financial demands of the Greek 
Cause, and possibly the recent election, Everett was in a tough spot and, despite 
Perkins’ earlier opposition to the conflict, had to ask a favor of him.  Whether or not 
Everett was truly desperate, it can be said with certainty that Perkins, to many 
Bostonians, was a “patron” and had the ability to provide both financial and political 
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support and approval. It speaks volumes when a United States Congressman has to 
ask a favor of a wealthy and well-connected private citizen, especially after what 
seems a strained (although not broken) friendship.  
 Aside from his political connections and financial influence over prominent 
individuals, there is also evidence that Perkins had a level of patronage and elitist 
connection to motivate and influence any person he hired or did business with. 
Particularly, Perkins seems to have brought certain individuals to financial 
prominence because he used family, political allies, and business associates to solely 
do business with these individuals. It was also by that same token that Perkins could 
punish these individuals if he became displeased by their services. Gilbert Stuart, for 
instance, painted several times for Perkins and his family and therefore received 
much business from the Perkins clan. In 1822, Perkins, James’ wife, and the Boston 
Athenaeum commissioned Stuart to produce a painting of James Perkins, Col. 
Thomas Perkins’ brother, who had recently passed away and donated much funds to 
the Boston Athenaeum. Expecting to see the painting near completion when visiting 
Stuart, Perkins was angry to find that the painting of his brother was only in sketch 
form and far from complete.191 Perkins stormed out of Stuart’s studio yelling “Very 
well, Mr. Stuart, you have inflicted an irreparable loss by your dilatoriness, and I 
shall never enter your studio again!”192 
 A few weeks later, Stuart and Perkins “bumped” into each other and Stuart, 
expressing great apology, insisted that Perkins come back with him to his studio to 
see the painting. Although reluctant, Perkins decided to follow the panicked artist. 
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At the studio, Stuart presented the completed painting to Perkins, what is unusual 
about this completed painting was the pace in which it was completed. Stuart was 
known for taking a long time on completing portraits and this painting in particular 
broke his record for how “quickly” it was completed.193 On one hand, Stuart could 
have completed this portrait so quickly because he did feel bad about James’ death 
and what the portrait meant to Perkins. This may be true, but it seems curious that 
Stuart would go out of his way to bring Perkins back to his studio after the client had 
just sworn him off. Could there have been a financial incentive for Stuart’s “artistic 
motivation?” 
 As it turns out, several of Stuart’s clients were Bostonians and many of them 
were either prominent figures in American society (Washington, the Adams family, 
etc.) or they were wealthy members of society, many of them connected to 
Perkins.194 These individuals were either related to Perkins, did business with 
Perkins, were friends with Perkins, or were political allies. These individuals 
included Israel Thorndike, Thomas Jefferson, Daniel Webster, John Adams, John Quincy 
Adams, Francis Jackson, John Thornton Kirkland, Henry Rice, Harrison G. Otis, Thomas 
MacDonough, William Gray, Henry Dearborn, the Quincy family, and several others.
195
 
If Stuart felt that losing Perkins’ patronage was insignificant, then James’ portrait would 
not have been completed so fast. The fact that Stuart suddenly worked so quickly and 
went out of his way to make it up to Perkins suggests that Perkins controlled a large 
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section of his income. If we are to accept that all of these other clients went to Stuart 
based on Perkins’ recommendation, then it must mean Perkins could have easily 
convinced them to boycott Stuart if the artist fell out of his favor. Therefore, not only 
does this indicate that Stuart’s business was shared by a certain section of society, but 
also that Stuart was, in essence, the client of the Perkins clan and could be rewarded or 
punished financially based upon the words of a single patron, Col. Thomas Perkins. If 
Perkins applied the same logic to other businesses and individuals in the Boston area, 
then it could indicate that most of Boston was subject to the will of a select group of 
wealthy individuals that were likely lead/controlled by Perkins.  
 Between politics, business, and family connections, Perkins was connected to 
local and national politicians. It was with these incentives and various applications of 
pressure that Perkins established for himself, his friends, and his family a virtual 
oligarchy and a system of favors in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Using this 
carefully crafted network of connections and financial pressure, Perkins protected his 
own business interests and gained the attention of national and local politicians to further 
protect and expand his investments. If Perkins did not have a direct connection to 
something he wanted, then he became involved in local organizations and political 
groups. This was for the purpose of expanding his influence and eventually using the 
organization to gain the favor of the public, or to have the organization act on his behalf 
(whether directly or indirectly) so as to protect his assets. His influence over Edward 
Everett in the Greek Committee of Boston is the best example of this. Other 
organizations that Perkins influenced were the Boston Athenaeum, the Protection 
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Committee, the Federalist Central Committee, and The Bunker Hill Monument 
Committee.
196
 
 Certainly these efforts gave Perkins much power and protected his immediate 
assets, it kept the competition at bay and it always ensured Perkins was at the front of the 
line for any and all government contracts. But why try and expand to national politics? 
Granted Perkins liked to have one or two people representing him in any major 
organization, but why did Perkins have several national politicians connected to him 
during the 1820s in particular (Webster, Everett, Adams, Otis)? The answer lies in the 
very nature of his business, mercantile trade.  
 To Perkins, the freedom of traveling the seas was paramount to his business; any 
war, embargo, or diplomatic faux pas meant disaster or hard times for Perkins’ overseas 
investments. During the War of 1812, Thomas and his brother James described the 
economic state of affairs as “this most distressing state of things,” and “unprofitable.”197 
Whether or not the war was for a just cause, Perkins viewed any and all disruption as bad 
and detrimental to his business. It interfered with his ventures and he could not tolerate 
that at any degree. When one looks into the actual nature of his business by the late 1810s 
and early 1820s, it is only made obvious that most of his investments have become 
dependent upon overseas trade, specifically in Canton.  
 Perkins, by the War of 1812, had established a “home base” in Canton with three 
non-industrial factories, and his nephew, John Perkins Cushing, was conducting business 
in Canton on Perkins’ behalf.198 Initially, Perkins’ business in Canton relied upon the sale 
of furs, specie, and typical European commodities (flour, paper, etc.), but by the mid-
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1810s these products had lost value. Opium and quicksilver thus became the most 
attractive alternatives, for they could double Perkins’ profits in the region. Perkins, a man 
always cautious of his investments, jumped at the chance to switch to opium.
199
 If the 
United States were to go to war or face some sort of embargo, then Perkins would face a 
sharp drop in profit and an overall economic slump. It only makes sense that Perkins 
would want to limit these disruptions by having loyal surrogates at the national level. 
 It must also be noted that Perkins and his associates were by no means pacifists 
and at times even welcomed conflict in other countries. During the Napoleonic Wars, 
Perkins joined the Higginsons (related by several marriages) in transporting and selling 
flour to British troops in Spain at marked up prices.
200
 Furthermore, Perkins even floated 
the idea of taking advantage of the Spanish Empire’s fragmented state and getting into 
trade with the newly forming South American Republics.
201
 While nothing immediately 
came of the prospects in Latin America, the Perkins and the Higginsons had invested 
wholeheartedly into the flour trade in Spain and were even smuggling the cargo past the 
French blockade.
202
 Thus, Perkins favored not a peaceful economy, but rather a “neutral” 
economy. Perkins wanted the United States out of foreign affairs and his own ships 
capable of reaching and trading with any port, for if there was a foreign war, he was 
willing to exploit it.  
                                                        
        
199
 Ibid., 265 and 285. 
        
200
 W. Richard T. Hackley to Thomas H. Perkins, 22 March 1811, microfilm reel 12, volume 
53, Thomas H. Perkins Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, MA.; Thomas H. 
Perkins to M.R.T. Hackley(?), 22 March 1811, microfilm reel 12, volume 53, Thomas H. Perkins 
Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, MA. 
         
201
 Carl Seaburg and Stanley Patterson, The Merchant Prince of Boston: Colonel T.H. 
Perkins, 1764-1854 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 220. 
         
202
 Ibid., 222. 
 80 
 
 The reason he wanted a “neutral” and “free trade” economy was because he both 
feared and experienced years where his ships were limited in their commerce capabilities 
because of either an embargo or ongoing conflict. His first brush with economic 
frustration came with the Embargo of 1807. While the United States was at peace, the 
government was technically not neutral and this severely limited mercantile prospects. 
Perkins had to accept economic uncertainty and ordered John Perkins Cushing to stay 
“out of danger till the storm blows over” and essentially to batten down the hatches if 
communication was cut off.
203
 Furthermore, James and Col. Thomas Perkins seemed to 
become increasingly cynical as the situation deteriorated and feared that the already 
limited trading prospects would become worse if Jefferson might plunge the country 
“into a Contest which would be ruinous and to defend a principle not worth a Cent to 
us.”204 Perkins did not care about the diplomacy of the situation, he only cared about how 
it affected his business, and, in his mind, Jefferson was meddlesome and foolish. When 
both the French and British began to seize American ships, and Jefferson ordered 
American ships to stay home, it struck a blow against Perkins’ business, as he was 
powerless to communicate with his surrogates in Canton and Europe, and was thus left 
unable to continue his affairs in a comprehensive sense.
205
  
 While the Embargo did stunt much of Perkins’ business, he was not completely 
disadvantaged. He still had a few ships abroad, and the British and French would allow 
American ships to return home. Seizing the opportunity, Perkins ordered both Cushing 
and his remaining vessels to stay in their foreign ports and conduct business at the local 
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level. Fortunately for Cushing, this meant he could still sail to the American Northwest 
since it was less affected by the Embargo, and trade furs with the Russians and the 
Chinese.
206
 This managed to keep Perkins afloat while he explored other ventures in light 
of this new economic landscape.  
 Another period of uncertainty for Perkins was the War of 1812; again, Perkins 
was unable to communicate with his foreign ports and had to seek other prospects for the 
time being. Perkins sent his nephew, Frederick Paine, with a list of instructions and to 
assist John Cushing in the Canton trade.
207
 Since Perkins could no longer communicate 
with his ships abroad, he decided to take a risk and focus on his iron trade in Vergennes, 
VT. Firing Theophilus Bradbury, Perkins and his partners took on direct management of 
the iron business and sought to continue their income until the War of 1812 was 
finished.
208
 Looking to get some return on this unusual economic situation, Perkins 
decided to sell cannon balls to the United States Navy at heavily marked up prices. 
Specifically, he sold the iron at $120 per ton when it only cost him $25 per ton to mine 
and cast the iron.
209
  
 To Perkins, the situation was far from ideal as the iron business had proven to be 
only marginally profitable since the beginning of the War. Thus, it can be safely assumed 
that Perkins wanted the war over as soon as possible and for his business in Canton to 
continue immediately. Perkins, being a state representative at the time, organized and 
helped commission a report that would both discredit Madison’s justification for the war 
(impressment), and take testimony from the merchant community of Boston, which 
                                                        
       
206
 Ibid., 189-190. 
       
207
 Ibid., 236. 
       
208
 Ibid., 236-238. 
       
209
 James Elliot Cabot, Extracts from Letterbooks of J & T H Perkins et al. (1886), 211-213.; 
Seaburg, The Merchant Prince, 238. 
 82 
 
meant interviewing himself and his Federalist merchant associates.
210
 In both James’ and 
Thomas’ testimonies, they maintained that cases of impressment for his sailors were 
merely a handful and most of those impressed were foreigners.
211
 Whether or not the 
evidence present by the committee is true, it demonstrates two very important facts about 
Col. Thomas Perkins. First, Perkins was willing to use his own authority as an elected 
representative to essentially benefit himself by not only generating an investigation that 
would help his business, but also using the testimonies of himself, his friends, his family, 
and business associates as evidence. Second, Perkins despised any and all economic 
uncertainty, he did not truly care about the war or foreign issues, he only wanted his 
business to go unhindered and to craft economic conditions favorable to his business.  
 As the conflict dragged on, Perkins became evermore impatient with his current 
predicament and decided to take stronger political action. In 1814 and 1815, Perkins 
decided to help organize the New England Secessionist movement and put into action a 
plan that would free Massachusetts and other states from the Union. Perkins became so 
involved in this movement that he was selected to be one of the three agents (the others 
being H.G. Otis and William Sullivan) to present the case for secession before the federal 
government in Washington D.C.
212
 The New England Secessionist movement failed 
because when Perkins and the others arrived in Washington the war had ended and their 
justification for leaving the Union had lost validity. This incident in Perkins’ life 
demonstrates that he was not really dedicated to any ideology or real political cause. On 
one hand, he sold munitions to the United States for the war effort, and, on the other 
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hand, he openly detested the conflict and actively organized to break from the Union. In 
some years he would praise the President and host a parade for the visiting politician, and 
in other years he was willing to mock every word of the President and threaten to secede 
from the Union. Perkins did not follow a political cause because he actually believed in 
it, but rather he used political events to benefit his business. If ensuring his overseas trade 
would continue unhindered required seceding from the United States, then he would not 
even bat an eye and secede wholeheartedly.  
 The War of 1812 and the Embargo of 1807 are significant because they pushed 
Perkins to explore all of his options when he was cut off from his foreign investments. 
Perkins tried his hand at the domestic industry and attempted to create a foreign trade 
network that could operate somewhat independently until the crises had passed. As 
Perkins learned, this was easier said than done and his return on investment tended to be 
far less than what he would make from the Canton Trade. In the War of 1812, Perkins 
tried to do something new, he attempted to affect the national government and essentially 
dictate United States foreign policy. His contribution to the New England Secession 
movement and the Massachusetts General Court House of Representatives Investigation 
Committee demonstrate this clear attempt to affect the national stage. Their ultimate 
failure in stopping the war only proved to Perkins that he needed to have a much more 
significant influence on the national stage. Whether it was through surrogates or 
campaigning for office himself, Perkins knew that he needed to influence the federal 
government in a much more direct way to protect his investments, The Greek War for 
Independence demonstrates the success of his ultimate plan.  
 84 
 
 Thomas H. Perkins, after recovering from the War of 1812, began to feel 
increasingly deeper incentives to influence the federal government as the Era of Good 
Feelings began to reveal potential problems. In 1815, eager to rebuild his funds, Perkins 
switched most of his business to the Opium Trade as it promised to double his profit and 
create a reliable market through the selling of Turkish opium to addicted Chinese people 
living in the Northern Provinces of China.
213
 Perkins still maintained a presence in the 
American Northwest and the Canton Fur Trade, but there was an intensification in 
competition as Russian fur traders moved into the Northwest region.
214
 In 1818 Perkins 
became even more invested in the Opium Trade as the Co-Hong trading guild suffered a 
major fine from the Chinese government for participating in the Opium Trade. As a 
result, competition in the Opium Trade decreased and this allowed Perkins to enter the 
market with a lowered price and the ability to make a long-lasting impact on the 
market.
215
 While Perkins’ operations were small compared to the British, he could use his 
factories and offshore ships to deal with the Chinese people directly. Selling up to 
100,000 pounds of opium, Perkins could store the drug in his vessels, drop off the 
product to purchases passing by in smaller vessels while the factories on shore would 
communicate with the purchasers and collect the money.
216
 This less competitive system 
made it easier for Perkins to focus on the Opium Trade and the Canton market, thus 
investing himself progressively more into the practice. 
 Another incentive that pushed Perkins more firmly into the Opium Trade was the 
recent passage of tariffs on cotton caused by the Compromise of 1820. Otis, who had 
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fought against the increase in tariffs, informed Perkins that the tariffs would hurt any 
merchants that built their fortune on foreign trade.
217
 While Boston was secure and it 
would not increase its own tariffs, New York City had approved the increase and, as the 
leading commercial center of the country, many of the other American ports would 
reflect this policy therefore making it difficult overall for those involved in commerce.
218
 
Thus, the cotton market was becoming problematic for Perkins and might have 
encouraged the merchant to participate less in that particular trade and instead focus his 
efforts in Canton.  
 In 1820 an 1821, Perkins only became more eager to invest in the opium trade as 
he and Cushing realized that they had cornered a section of the market. The Chinese in 
the Northern Provinces preferred exclusively Turkish opium, the British and other 
European traders were selling Bengalese and Indian opium, and these types did not 
appeal to that part of the market. Fortunately for Perkins, he was only one of a handful of 
merchants that had access to the Turkish strain of opium. Perkins and Cushing had 
enough of the opium warehoused that they could control the market and sell the product 
strategically at the highest price.
219
 This part of the market was so profitable and safe for 
Perkins that he was able to purchase opium from Turkey at $2.50 a pound and sell it for 
more than 3 to 4 times as much ($7 to $10 a pound).
220
 Thus it was only to Perkins’ 
advantage to keep himself in the Turkish opium sector of the market because he had very 
little competition, he could make an astronomical profit, and he could control the market. 
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If he were to try and enter the Bengal or Indian opium market, he would have to deal with 
the British, who could raise their prices at any time, and the South Asian type of opium 
was so common that Perkins would constantly be faced with competition and there would 
be only a small margin of profit.   
 After this reaffirmation into the Canton trade, Perkins and his family decided to 
formally withdraw from the Northwest Fur Trade. The Northwest Company no longer 
saw the venture as mutually profitable, and furs in China had drastically decreased in 
value over the years.
221
 Additionally, James and Thomas, in 1821, decided to change the 
management of the organization by incorporating their sons as co-owners of the 
company.
222
 Thus, in 1821, the entirety of the business rested upon the Opium Trade and 
the good will of the Turks, this being just before the beginning of the Greek War for 
Independence. While 1821 might have seemed like a good year for the Perkins firm, 1822 
would existentially threaten the very structure of Thomas’ business.  
 On August 1, 1822, James Perkins, Thomas’ most trusted business partner and 
brother, died and left Thomas to manage a business that went half-way around the 
world.
223
 A few months later in March 1823, Perkins received word that his Canton 
factories had caught fire and were burnt to the ground in November of 1822.
224
 Aside 
from the factories burning down, $20,000 worth of specie was plundered in the confusion 
and the merchandise in the factories was lost. Fortunately, the merchandise’s value was 
“trifle” and most of the books and papers concerning their business were saved.225 While 
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the fire was not a complete disaster, it did require a substantial reinvestment of funds, and 
Perkins needed to go to London in order to secure woolen cloth cargo so as to beat the 
British in re-establishing their foothold in the Canton market.
226
 Late 1822 and early 1823 
proved to be trying times for Perkins’ business, he was now completely investing into 
Canton opium with very few alternative commodities, he had lost his brother and 
business partner, and had just lost a substantial holding in Canton due to a fire. 
Furthermore, Perkins’ opium supply was a niche market that had little competition, 
switching to any alternative would be financially damaging. As Seaburg and Patterson 
explain, Perkins investment in the opium trade relied entirely upon the good will and 
inclination of the Ottoman Empire to do business with Perkins.
227
 Not to mention, 
Perkins had just switched over part of the management of the company to the Cabots and 
his son, T.H. Perkins Jr., both of whom were relatively new to trade in Canton. 
 In 1823, as the Greek War for Independence started to intensify and the 
American public began to show growing support for the Greek cause, Perkins began to 
realize how fragile his situation was. The misfortunes of the past year could be dealt with 
easily as long as the Turks were still interested in trading. If the United States went to war 
with Turkey or even just embargoed the Turks, then it would be an utter disaster for 
Perkins’ business and, even once the conflict had ended, Perkins might have to withdraw 
from Canton completely. Fortunately, Perkins had prepared for this situation and had 
learned from his misfortunes during the War of 1812 and the Embargo of 1807. Using his 
political network in Massachusetts, his business ties, and the influence he had over key 
politicians, Col. Thomas Perkins was able to infiltrate the federal government with loyal 
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surrogates and ultimately influence U.S. foreign policy, not just for the Greek conflict, 
but also for the rest of the 19
th
 Century.  
 Perkins was not unfamiliar with influencing national politicians, although it had 
been limited to one or two individuals in the past, he knew how to extend his influence 
beyond the Hudson River. Harrison G. Otis served as Massachusetts’ Senator and 
Congressman and was an active leader in Massachusetts politics, he was also a close 
friend, political ally, business partner, and relative of Thomas H. Perkins.
228
 Otis was also 
a Blue Light Federalist, attended the Hartford Convention, and traveled with Perkins to 
Washington at the end of the war. Perkins knew how to place people in power and 
already had close friends legislating for him on the national level.  
 The Federalist roots of Col. Thomas Perkins also helped him rub elbows with 
some of America’s most influential and historical leaders, particularly, John Adams. In a 
letter concerning a gift of grapes, John Adams thanked Perkins and recalled their long-
time friendship.
229
 This demonstrates a somewhat personal relationship that went beyond 
simple professional formalities. Perkins also helped lead a parade in John Adams’ honor 
and formed a mutually respectful relationship from this occasion.
230
 At the beginning of 
the 1807 Embargo, both Perkins and Adams presided over the Federalist Party 
Committee in Fanueil Hall, demonstrating (at least) a professional relationship where 
they both organized party events together.
231
 Furthermore, aside from their political 
commonalities, both were co-investors in a Boston theater and, thus, were business 
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associates.
232
 Col. Thomas Perkins and John Adams Sr. knew each other and, by all 
accounts, seemed to have a friendly relationship that gave Perkins clout amongst the 
Federalist Party and some influence over Adams’ son, John Quincy Adams. 
 John Quincy Adams, as mentioned earlier in this section, had to contend with 
Perkins for most of his political career. Using a stick and carrot method to whip Adams 
into line, Perkins seemed to have a rather complicated relationship with America’s sixth 
president. Perkins, being a member of the Federalist Central Committee, signed off on 
every politician that was elected to a Massachusetts public office, Adams, undoubtedly, 
was introduced to Perkins in this way or through his father.
233
 Perhaps John Quincy 
Adams first entered this relationship of reward and punishment through the “election” 
process, he owed Perkins for his position in some way and would “fall in line” when he 
was asked. Whether or not such a system was formally in place, one can only speculate. 
Though, it is curious that Adams’ political and social ostracism as well as prevention 
from taking public office in 1808 was directly attributed to his half-approval of the 1807 
Embargo. What is more interesting was Perkins’ central role in preventing Adams from 
being elected to office.
234
 Despite this checkered past, Perkins and Adams saw each other 
frequently and had to deal with each other politically on an everyday basis.
235
  
 That being said, there must have been some sort of understanding or agreement 
between Perkins and Adams to communicate on a regular basis and work so hard for the 
other. For instance, Perkins was opposed to the Greek War for Independence because it 
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threatened his business and, coincidently, John Quincy Adams proved to be one of the 
strongest opponents to the war, both as the United States Secretary of State and as the 
President of the United States.
236
 Adams, oddly enough, also advocated for a “Most 
Favored Nation” status with the Ottoman Empire, this agreement essentially secured 
Perkins’ assets indefinitely and made sure the Opium Trade could continue.237  
 Adams, as it turned out, was financially tied to Perkins and his associates during 
the Greek War for Independence. In a letter from 1827, Adams thanked Perkins for his 
business advice and getting him stocks in a factory with Israel Thorndike.
238
  
Furthermore, Perkins was initially an ardent support of John Quincy Adams for his 1828 
bid for the presidency. Using his political connections, funds, and the network he had in 
Massachusetts, Perkins was able to give Adams a running start.
239
  
 Politics, as it would be, stirred up scandal for Adams as his connections to 
Perkins and the Federalist Party ended up landing the President into some hot water. 
Stemming from a letter written by Thomas Jefferson, the issue of the Hartford 
Convention and the New England Secession movement called into question Adams’ 
loyalties and connections to the Federalist Party. Adams foolishly tried to explain away 
the events and, essentially, accused the Federalist of being traitors that were in league 
with the British.
240
 Perkins, to say the least, did not approve of this and he, as well as 
other politicians such as Otis, stepped forward questioning Adams’ comments. This lead 
to a publication war in the newspaper between Adams and Perkins’ alias, A Merchant, 
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while it rustled feathers and put Adams into a rather awkward situation, the incident did 
not help Adams in the election at all.
241
 Perkins withdrew his support and Jackson made 
fast work of Adams’ faux pas in the newspaper. Needless to say, Adams was not re-
elected.
242
  
 Whether or not Perkins and Adams were friendly, it is almost certain that the two 
knew each other for most their political careers. Perkins seemed to have some sort of 
influence over Adams whenever he was in office and there was some sort of reward and 
punishment between the two men. Perkins pulled Adams into his influence both 
politically and financially. With Adams under his influence, Perkins was able to use 
Adams’ position in the federal government to protect his own interests.  
 The other unfortunate figure that fell under Perkins’ influence was Edward 
Everett, a passionate supporter of the Greek War for Independence, was also caught up in 
a similar reward and punishment situation. As previously mentioned, Perkins and Everett 
were both members of the Boston Greek Committee and Everett, after being elected to 
the United States House of Representatives, was in dire financial straights and asked 
Perkins for his financial support in the conflict.
243
 Perkins also used his influence to deter 
Everett at the beginning of the conflict by writing anonymous letters to the local 
newspaper counterpointing the articles published by Everett and the committee.
244
 
Despite this odd relationship of both opposing and somewhat supporting each other, 
Everett and Perkins also shared a financial and professional relationship with several 
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different projects. For instance, both men organized the Bunker Hill Monument 
Association and worked closely together.
245
 
 Everett was also connected financially to Perkins through his brother Alexander 
Everett. Alexander, also a friend and business associate of John Quincy Adams, had 
conducted some business with Perkins and he was also a friend through Perkins’ daughter 
Eliza.
246
 Perkins also dealt with Edward Everett directly in politics. When Perkins began 
to organize the re-election campaign for John Quincy Adams, Perkins called upon Everett 
and Daniel Webster to help draw up the plans.
247
 Thus, Everett was within Perkins’ 
sphere of influence and, at the very least, Everett was obligated to Perkins because of his 
political prominence in the state, as well as the mixed financial support Everett needed 
and Perkins could provide for the Greek War of Independence. Thus, despite the support 
Everett had for the Greeks, Perkins more than likely “changed his mind” on this issue by 
using his political and financial influence. Simultaneously, Perkins might have also used 
his influence with the wealthy Boston merchant community to prevent donations from 
reaching the Greek Committee of Boston. Much like the affair with Gilbert Stuart, 
Perkins more than likely convinced his wealthy peers to withhold their donations to the 
Greek Committee of Boston, or at least threatened Everett that he might do so. Thus, this 
put Everett in a position where he had to water-down his rhetoric on the cause so as to 
gather and send any funds to Greece.  
 Daniel Webster also fell well within this sphere of influence due to his friendship 
with not only Perkins, but also with several of Perkins’ business associates. Israel 
                                                        
        
245
 Ibid., 319.; George Washington Warren, The History of the Bunker Hill Monument 
Association (Boston, MA: James R. Osgood Co., 1877), 103. 
        
246
 Carl Seaburg and Stanley Patterson, The Merchant Prince of Boston: Colonel T.H. 
Perkins, 1764-1854 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 222-223. 
        
247
 Ibid., 350-352.  
 93 
 
Thorndike, one of the wealthiest people in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts at the 
time, had conducted business several times with Perkins both in Canton and on local 
prospects. Thorndike was also one of Perkins’ oldest friends and had often invested in 
projects together for mutual benefit, some of the most noteworthy investments they 
shared in were the (now) McLean Hospital, the Massachusetts Cape Cod Grand Canal, 
Nahant Hotel, and the Bunker Hill Monument.
248
 Interestingly, Webster was also a 
participant in the Bunker Hill Monument project and was a very friendly neighbor of 
Israel Thorndike.
249
 So close were these two individuals that, in fact, they had a door cut 
between their houses so they could both host larger parties together and socialize together 
more often.
250
 Webster, aside from being in debt to Perkins at a time, had been a close 
friend through their mutual relationship with Thorndike and, too, worked on the Bunker 
Hill Monument project together.
251
 In addition, having had a long political career in 
Boston, it is impossible that Webster would not have had to know Perkins in order to 
achieve the public offices he held during his career. Thus, Webster was not only an 
individual that fell directly under Perkins’ influence, but also was more than likely a very 
friendly acquaintance that often shared in Perkins’ business dealings.  
 Considering all the connections, investments, relations, and political presence 
Col. Thomas H. Perkins had in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, it is evident that 
this individual had some of the greatest influence on the Early Republic in American 
history. Furthermore, his investments, dealings, and involvement in the Canton Opium 
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Trade prove to be the greatest motivator for Col. Perkins’ actions in politics, business, 
and American society in general. His connections to national politicians, such as Edward 
Everett, Daniel Webster, John Quincy Adams, James Monroe, and Harrison G. Otis, 
demonstrate an unusual amount of political and financial influence that cannot be ignored 
by American historians. Thus, when studying America’s involvement in the Greek War 
for Independence, it is impossible to attribute America’s decision to remain neutral to 
actual diplomatic considerations that were in the interest of the country. Rather, it is more 
likely that America’s neutrality was caused by Col. Thomas H. Perkins since the people 
who ended up creating the act of neutrality both knew Col. Thomas Perkins for a large 
part of their lives and were obligated to Perkins’ interests out of friendship, political 
patronage, or mutually shared financial stakes.  
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Conclusion 
 
 During the first years of the Early American Republic, the American people were 
faced with a diplomatic crisis that tested the very identity of American culture and values. 
As Greece struggled for independence during the 1820s, several European powers rushed 
to aid the Greeks in their cause for independence. Inspired by their mutual love of liberty, 
a common faith in Christianity, and an admiration of the Ancient World, Americans in all 
levels of society clamored to aid in the Greek Revolution. It was through private 
donation, political organization, and volunteerism that regular Americans eagerly 
demanded a formal presence in the Greek War for Independence. 
 Despite the endorsement of prominent individuals, such as Thomas Jefferson, 
Edward Everett, and Henry Clay, the United States government chose not to become 
involved in the Greek War for Independence. Formally excusing itself on the basis of the 
Monroe Doctrine and an uncomfortable association with the British, the United States 
government crafted a foreign policy of diplomatic neutrality that would last the entirety 
of the 19
th
 Century. Despite the seemingly legitimate pardoning from the conflict, 
inconsistencies in political rhetoric and action reveal a deeper and more sinister truth 
behind America’s neutrality.  
 The political, social, and financial association that Edward Everett, James 
Monroe, Daniel Webster, and John Quincy Adams had with the Boston merchant Col. 
Thomas H. Perkins and his comrades reveals a shocking and corrupt-laden tale about the 
events surrounding America’s neutrality in the Greek War for Independence. Perkins, 
looking out for only his business investments, used his political monopoly in 
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Massachusetts and finances to influence and control politicians at the federal level. 
Fearing for his dependence on the opium market in the Ottoman Empire, Perkins made 
certain that both the Congress and the President of the United States not only avoid any 
bad relations with the Ottoman Empire, but also made sure to strengthen its current 
economic ties. Thus, through the orders and interests of Thomas H. Perkins and the 
merchant community, the United States government chose to relinquish any and all 
formal interest in the Greek War for Independence. Therefore, the government turned 
against both the will of the American people and the principles of Liberalism, 
Republicanism, and Classicism in which the nation was founded upon. Thus, the United 
States government not only chose a stance of neutrality that only a select group of people 
benefitted from, but also set the precedence for American foreign policy for the rest of 
the 19
th
 Century.    
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